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RECOUPMENT PATENT*
MIRIAM MARCOWITZ-BITTON,** YOTAM KAPLAN*** & MAAYAN PEREL****
The patent system aims to encourage innovation while keeping its own
administrative costs to a minimum. Considering the centrality of innovation to
twenty-first century economic activity, patent law is widely viewed as a crucial
element of our legal system. And yet, by any standard, our patent system is
broken. At present, the United States patent system encourages filing a plethora
of low-quality patents that have no true innovative value, is plagued by
opportunistic patent trolls, and produces endless amounts of costly litigation.
Thus, the patent system stalls, rather than encourages, innovation.
This Article demonstrates how these phenomena are due to central design flaws
in the current system. First, although the patent system is designed to encourage
investment in innovation, it lacks a mechanism for directly examining an
inventor’s level of investment. This major flaw systematically ignores investment
in innovation, which is the single most important factor the patent system seeks
to promote. Second, the current system offers one-size-fits-all protection,
granting the same twenty-year monopoly to any and all inventions. This
inflexible legal standard is outdated and inappropriate given the wide variety of
inventions it addresses and the immense differences between them.
The core of this Article proposes structural reform designed to remedy these
fundamental flaws. First, we suggest that the patent system must explicitly
consider the investment made in each specific invention when deciding what
level of legal protection each invention merits. Second, we advocate a departure
from the current one-size-fits-all model in favor of a more tailored approach,
offering different periods of protection for different inventions. These two
solutions would produce a system in which inventions are granted protection for
a duration that depends on the level of investment each invention requires. We
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call this model a “recoupment patent” and highlight its advantages over the
current system.
Under the recoupment patent model, filing for patent protection will require
documentation of investment in the invention, which will serve as the basis for
determining duration of protection. Protection will expire once the investment is
recouped and a fixed percentage of profit is earned. Filing and renewal fees will
also be calculated based on documented investment. Additionally, investment
will serve as a basis for calculating royalties (or damages in subsequent
litigation). Under this proposed regime, the patentee bears the burden of
demonstrating the level of investment in the invention. This regime is more
accurately tailored to incentivize innovation while avoiding the excessive
protection under the current one-size-fits-all system. This new regime also
incorporates mechanisms to prevent inventors from misstating their investment.
Throughout the Article, we address the challenges created by our proposed
recoupment patent model and highlight its advantages over the existing system
and over other reform proposals. We also discuss extensions and possible
refinements to the basic conception outlined above.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent law aims to encourage innovation.1 Patent protection grants an
inventor exclusive rights to use, sell, or license her invention for a limited time
period of twenty years.2 This provides incentive for investment in innovation
by allowing the inventor to enjoy the fruits of her labor.3 Yet, the patent system
has been under fire in the last few decades by critics highlighting its major flaws
and negative effects on innovation.4 The current system is criticized for being
overly rigid—offering identical treatment to radically different inventions.5
This means patent protection is often either too narrow or overbroad.
Patent protection is too narrow when it offers insufficient incentive for
inventors to invest in research and development. This problem is especially
pronounced with pharmaceutical companies, for which the costs of developing
a new drug are often estimated in the millions.6 When innovation is that costly,
the standard twenty-year patent protection is often simply not enough for
inventors to recoup their investment.7 In such cases, the company cannot afford
to invest, and the public is denied a new and improved medical solution.8
On the other hand, patents can also be overbroad, granting protection
when it is not needed.9 In such cases, patent protection can be destructive,

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the enumerated power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018) (explaining that once a patent has been granted, the patent
owner has the exclusive right to make, use, sell, offer for sale, or import the claimed invention into the
United States).
3. See Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 168–71 (2005) [hereinafter Cotropia, After-Arising] (discussing how patent
protection provides patentees an opportunity to invent and have exclusive control over their
invention); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 129, 129–31 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante] (protecting inventors’ investments in their
ideas).
4. See JAMES BESSEN & M ICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT F AILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 2 (2008) (showing that while patents
provide incentives to invest in research, development, and commercialization, for most businesses
today, patents fail to provide predictable property rights); Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Patent Rights in a
Climate of Intellectual Property Rights Skepticism, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 110–11 (2016).
5. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 3–5, 136–37 (2009) (showcasing the existence of a patent crisis, where patents calibrated to
the needs of the pharmaceutical industry are not able to accommodate information technologies, and
vice versa, and suggesting that courts should make industry-specific inquiries to provide an appropriate
level of incentive for each industry).
6. Id. at 204 n.1.
7. Id. at 7–8.
8. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 88.
9. See Maayan Perel, Reviving the Gatekeeping Function: Optimizing the Exclusion Potential of Subject
Matter Eligibility, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 237, 242–43 (2013) [hereinafter Perel, Gatekeeping
Function].
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hindering downstream innovation.10 The phenomenon of patent thickets is
emblematic of this problem.11 Patent thickets are created when different
inventors make small cumulative contributions to the same product.12 The
current patent system offers full patent protection for each such fragmental
contribution to the invention, thus creating a multitude of overlapping patents
that cover a single product.13 Since a single entity would have extreme difficulty
collecting licenses from all the patent owners, the existence of patent protection
can effectively prevent both commercialization and further development of the
invention.14 In this way, patent protection hinders innovation rather than
promotes it.15
The issue of overprotection under the existing patent system is related to
the more general problem of low patent quality.16 Low patent quality means
that many patents offer protection for negligible technological developments
that are close to being obvious or were created with little to no effort.17 Such
low-quality patents offer owners the same level of protection as do high-quality
patents, barring nonowners from utilizing many technologies and products.
This means that the patent system routinely grants patent owners the power to
interfere with the innovative activity of others, even when these patent owners
made little to no scientific contribution.18 Low-quality patents thus obstruct
innovation and progress rather than stimulate them and are generally perceived
as inventions that do not require patent incentives.19
Moreover, with low-quality patents, substantial uncertainty attends their
validity, scope, and enforcement, imposing heavy costs on those who make
decisions based on patents such as “patentees, prospective licensees, investors,”

10. See id. at 282–88 (explaining other incentives for invention that could be hindered by patent
protections).
11. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 78.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,
1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 121–22 (2000).
15. Id. at 121.
16. See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2140–
41 (2009) (discussing the problems created by low patent quality).
17. See Perel, Gatekeeping Function, supra note 9, at 272–73 (explaining that even when an
invention appears to lack novelty or be obvious under sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act, there is
a real problem of retrieving the invalidating prior art necessary to execute a novelty or nonobviousness
rejection). This problem is bolstered by objective limitations of patent examiners that have only limited
time to review and apply the prior art. See id.
18. Id. at 282–84 (describing such patents as ones that cover inventions whose development is
not dependent on the Patent Act’s pecuniary incentives). Such patents are unworthy because “they fail
to reflect an appropriate ‘balance between the ex post costs of short-term monopoly and the benefits of
higher ex ante incentives to innovate.’” Id. at 282 (quoting The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading
Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 370, 376–77 (2010)).
19. Wagner, supra note 16, at 2138.
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and others.20 Furthermore, “a low-quality patent system is characterized by a
large number of errors in the patent-granting process.”21 In addition to
inappropriate grants, inappropriate denials of patentable inventions can prevent
the full commercialization of important innovations.22 Finally, low-quality
patents also impact litigation.23 The uncertainty that surrounds low-quality
patents increases litigation and promotes more complex and expensive disputes,
which increases the costs of the entire system.24 It is no surprise that the demand
to improve patent quality is the centerpiece of many current calls for patent
reform.25 Scholars have previously suggested that the problem of low-quality
patents is especially pronounced in the context of business method and software
patents, and patent quality in these areas is hotly debated.26 To date, discussions
have yielded many proposals for reform, some of which have been fully or partly
adopted.27 However, these types of patents still threaten general patent
quality.28
Overbroad patent protection is also problematic because it fuels the
activity of “patent trolls”—entities who abuse patent protection to secure shortterm gains with no relation to innovative activity.29 Patent trolling is associated
with the generation of income, not through commercialization, but through
aggressive licensing and litigation of patents by nonpracticing entities
(“NPEs”).30 Recent empirical work shows that most patent lawsuits are indeed
asserted by NPEs, suggesting that the problem of patent trolling is yet to be
solved.31 While encroaching upon the constitutional mandate to “promote the
20. Id. at 2140.
21. Id. at 2141.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2142 (observing the correlation between increased litigation and low-quality patents).
24. Id. at 2140–43 (discussing the effects of low-quality patents).
25. Id. at 2136. Most efforts and proposals in this context view patent quality as mainly an
administrative concern. Id. at 2158–61 (discussing the administrative changes on which patent reform
is focused). Other proposals focus on reforming the prosecution process. Id. at 2162 (describing the
proposed prosecution-focused patent reform).
26. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 187–214 (discussing software and business method
patents).
27. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 100–08 (discussing patent reform initiatives).
28. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 21–24 (discussing the problematic nature of software
patents).
29. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, How Often Do Non-Practicing Entities
Win Patent Suits?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 237, 242–44 (2017) (discussing different definitions for
patent trolls); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 2117, 2117 (2013).
30. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 29, at 2163–65 (criticizing lawyers that file patent
infringement claims against companies). Some scholars have suggested that NPEs may serve a useful
function in supporting the creation of a market for patent rights. See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan,
Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 444 (2014).
31. Shawn P. Miller et al., Who’s Suing Us? Decoding Patent Plaintiffs Since 2000 with the Stanford
NPE Litigation Dataset, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 235, 271 (2018).
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Progress of Science and useful Arts,”32 patent trolls divert investment from
research and development to potentially unwarranted licensing fees or
litigation.33 Patent trolling is often facilitated by the granting of low-quality
patents that cover overly broad claims.34
Patent trolls assert “overbroad, obvious, or non-novel patents” to force
alleged infringers to pay licensing fees for a patent that they believe is invalid
or otherwise face “costly and protracted ligation.”35
Unfortunately, the current regime tolerates patent trolling.36 Modern
patent law does not require that inventors “manufacture[], sell, or market their
writings or ideas” in exchange for patent protection37 but rather affords
patentees exclusive rights over their inventions without demanding that they
exploit their inventions to the benefit of the public in return.38 Additionally, it
does not impose any limitation on the ultimate price of licensing that patent
owners may demand. The moment a patent is issued, its owner is afforded an
unlimited right to exploit it for her own narrow financial benefit.39
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that authors and inventors have exclusive rights to
their respective works).
33. For an opposite position, suggesting that NPEs have a positive role in serving as efficiencyenhancing business intermediaries between inventors and commercializers, see generally Ryan T.
Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case Studies of Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2014);
James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent
Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189 (2006); Michael Risch, Licensing Acquired Patents, 21
GEO. MASON L. REV. 979 (2014); and Daniel F. Spulber, Patent Licensing and Bargaining with
Innovative Complements and Substitutes, 70 RES. ECON. 693, 711 (2016).
34. Susan Walmsley Graf, Comment, Improving Patent Quality Through Identification of Relevant
Prior Art: Approaches To Increase Information Flow to the Patent Office, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 495,
498–99 (2007) (arguing that patent trolling is driven by issuance of poor-quality patents and explaining
how poor-quality patents containing broad claims are used offensively to obtain licenses or bring
infringement lawsuits).
35. Id. at 498.
36. See Katherine E. White, Preserving the Patent Process To Incentivize Innovation in Global
Economy, 13 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 1–2 (2006) (suggesting major amendments to the
Patent Act in order to make patent laws more favorable to patentees and disadvantageous patent trolls).
It has been argued that the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.), which made it more difficult to join defendants in patent
infringement suits, does not address the problem of patent trolls that Congress had sought to resolve.
See Holly Forsberg, Diminishing the Attractiveness of Trolling: The Impacts of Recent Judicial Activity on
Non-Practicing Entities, 12 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 3–4 (2011); Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The
America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH . 673, 687–88 (2012).
37. White, supra note 36, at 5.
38. Id. (noting that manufacture and sale of products are not required under the Patent Clause of
the U.S. Constitution). Note also that this has not always been the legal practice because throughout
most of the twentieth century courts were able to limit protection for nonpracticing entities under the
“paper patent” doctrine. See John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
1359, 1363 (2013) (showing that the abolition of the paper patent doctrine benefited patent trolls and
was a bane to true innovators).
39. White, supra note 36, at 11 (emphasizing that the exclusive rights of patent owners include
their ability to demand any price for their own benefit).
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Many scholars have perceived these challenges as a “patent crisis” or
“patent failure,” insisting on a comprehensive reexamination of the current
system.40 These challenges introduce significant costs for patentees, innovation,
and society at large.41 Scholars and policymakers have made numerous attempts
to introduce different types of reforms to address these challenges.42 Such
attempts range from providing discretion to courts to tailor protection to
different technologies on a case-by-case basis,43 to calls for a comprehensive
legislative reform of the patent system,44 and even more drastic calls to abolish
the patent system and introduce an alternative regime of prizes and rewards.45
In this Article, we attribute the failure of the patent system to fundamental
design flaws in its current structure. First, the patent system does not require
the patentee to prove that the invention required significant investment, or any
investment at all for that matter. This undermines investment in innovation,
which is the primary goal of the patent system.46 Second, our system awards all
patentees uniformly, once they meet the Patent Act threshold requirements,
with a twenty-year government sanctioned monopoly over their purported
invention.47 This one-size-fits-all approach often results in either
overprotection or underprotection and is inherently unfair because it provides
the same level of compensation to all patentees without taking into account the
great differences in levels of investment required by different inventions.

40. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 235–53 (suggesting a series of reforms to improve the
notice function of patent law); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 3.
41. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 46–72, 147–64 (demonstrating how patents fail
to provide predictable legal boundaries to their owners); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 3–6 (arguing
that the current patent system is in a crisis because it does not incentivize innovation properly); Gerard
N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE D AME L.
REV. 1809, 1837 (2007) (“One response is that trolls already impose a tax on innovation . . . .”).
42. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 100–08 (concluding that courts might be more effective
than Congress in achieving some patent reform by tailoring patent law to specific industries through
different policy levers and common law doctrines).
43. Id. at 103–04.
44. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 235–52 (discussing legislative reforms to
improve patent system).
45. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 44–45; Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56
VAND. L. REV. 115, 119–20 (2003) (advocating for a reward system to complement existing IP
protection) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Patent Prizes]; Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 899, 939–41 (2002).
46. See infra Section II.A (explaining how investment and innovation are tied together in patent
theory). For economic literature showing a linear relationship between investment and increased
innovation, see generally Valentina Meliciani, The Relationship Between R&D, Investment and Patents: A
Panel Data Analysis, 32 APPLIED ECON. 1429 (2000).
47. The term of patent rights lasts until twenty years from the date the patent application is filed,
with special term extensions available if the prosecution of the patent was unreasonably delayed or if
regulatory approval of a drug consumed a portion of the patent term. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), (b), 155–
156 (2018); Maayan Perel, From Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) to Non-Practiced Patents (NPPs): A
Proposal for a Patent Working Requirement, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 754 (2015).
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We propose to remedy these flaws by introducing a novel regime of
differential, investment-based patents. Under this new model, the patentee
must prove the level of investment in each invention, and the duration of the
patent will depend on that investment. Investment includes any expense
incurred in the process of research and development of the invention, including
employee salaries, equipment and materials, lab services, consulting services,
administrative costs, regulatory costs, commercialization costs, and other costs
incurred while developing an invention. This will establish a time frame to
recoup investment and earn some level of profit. Such a regime will tailor the
protection it offers patentees specifically to match the required economic
incentive, thus avoiding both underprotection and overprotection. It will
address the problem of low-quality patents by limiting their duration or
altogether refusing them protection. This regime will also prevent opportunistic
behavior by patent trolls, who rely heavily on the ability to acquire cheap, old,
or low-quality patents.48
Our proposal offers a structural reform to the patent system that is also a
natural and fitting legal change. To support the feasibility of our proposal, we
show that similar regimes designed to allow recoupment of investment in
innovation have existed in the past. The Patent Act of 1836 established the key
elements of the patent system as we still know them today49: a patent office,50
the process of patent application,51 the hiring of professional examiners,52 and a
library of prior art.53 The 1836 Act also introduced the possibility to extend the
period of patent protection beyond the term for which it was originally granted
when inventors were able to prove that the existing patent did not allow them
“reasonable remuneration” for their expenses and ingenuity.54 This provision
was later abandoned, mainly for evidentiary reasons and due to its high
administrative cost.55 As technological advancements have radically cut such
costs since the nineteenth century, and in light of the current crisis in the patent

48. Introducing short-term patent protection will reduce patent trolling, as it has been shown that
patent trolls typically litigate older patents. See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation
Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1309, 1322–27 (2013) (providing empirical evidence showing that, while product-producing companies
usually enforce their patents soon after issuance, NPEs begin asserting their patents relatively late in
the patent term and frequently continue to litigate until expiration).
49. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 507–09 (2004);
Chauncey Smith, A Century of Patent Law, 5 Q.J. ECON. 44, 47–48 (1890).
50. Smith, supra note 49, at 47.
51. Id.
52. Max Stul Oppenheimer, Progress or Profit: Reconsidering the Shortened Statutory Period Scheme,
36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 427, 429 n.19 (2018).
53. Id.
54. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 125; see also Smith, supra note 49, at 48.
55. Smith, supra note 49, at 49.
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system, we argue that the time is now ripe for a version of this long-lost
provision to be reintroduced into the patent system.56
We advocate for built-in safety valves that will prevent abusive behavior
by patentees. These include calculating filing and renewal fees based on the
level of investment documented by the patentee.57 Similarly, licensees’ royalties
and damages for patent infringement might also be partially calculated based
on the patentee’s level of investment. The Article also explores the possibility
of tailoring patent duration according to other metrics besides investment. Such
alternative routes might be appropriate to offer protection for those rare
inventions that have great economic value but did not require great investment,
such as “spark of genius” inventions.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the current model of patent
protection, exploring the flaws of its one-size-fits-all approach. This part
demonstrates that the failure of the existing system can be attributed to
fundamental structural flaws. In particular, the existing system seeks to
incentivize innovation but never directly observes, verifies, or considers the
level of investment or ingenuity in such innovation. We demonstrate the
impracticality of this type of institutional arrangement. Part II introduces the
proposed differential model: an investment-based patent regime. It discusses
the characteristics and details of such a regime, proposing safeguards required
for its operation. This part also explores the mechanisms and institutions that
can be used to measure and evaluate investment in patents. Part III evaluates
the merit of the proposed model, comparing its advantages and disadvantages.
We show that a tailored investment-based patent regime brings the patent
system closer to a system of rewards and prizes, allowing inventors to recoup
the investment of their invention while disincentivizing the filing of low-quality
and valueless patents. Part III thus highlights the advantages of the proposed
model as a potential solution to the key problems of the current patent system.
It also discusses some counterarguments and challenges prompted by our
proposal, mainly addressing the arguably significant administrative costs
necessary for the operation of our tailored approach. Part IV compares our
model to other proposals for reform and highlights the advantages of our
proposal over those alternatives.

56. See Promoting the Useful Arts: How Can Congress Prevent the Issuance of Poor Quality Patents?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019)
(statement of Andrew Hirsfeld, Commissioner for Patents USPTO), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hirshfeld%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc./F6UQFMT7]; Udi Cohen, Artificial Intelligence Will Help To Solve the USPTO’s Patent Quality Problem, I.P.
WATCHDOG (Nov. 23, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/11/23/artificial-intelligence-willhelp-solve-usptos-patent-quality-problem/id=116302/ [https://perma.cc/6PUF-B87B].
57. This is contrary to Love’s reform proposal to generally increase the frequency and magnitude
of maintenance fee payments in the latter half of the patent term. See Love, supra note 48, at 1357.
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I. THE EXISTING REGIME AND THE PATENT CRISIS
Patents are granted to incentivize innovation.58 They provide their owners
with a reward in the form of a bundle of exclusive rights over their inventions,
allowing owners exclusive economic benefits.59 Without such protection,
inventors may have insufficient incentive to invest, fearing they will not be able
to enjoy the fruits of their labor.60 Patent protection is therefore necessary for
the advancement of human knowledge, science, and technology.61 Yet, the social
gain of enhanced innovation comes with a price. To incentivize innovation,
society grants inventors exclusive ownership of their inventions.62 This results
in excessively high prices of goods subject to monopolistic patent protection as
well as consequentially low production.63 Patent law seeks to resolve this costbenefit tension by limiting the duration of exclusivity.64 The current system
applies a one-size-fits-all approach, according the same twenty-year period of
protection to all inventions irrespective of their value.65 In addition to this time
limitation, patent law provides statutory and doctrinal safeguards against
potential imbalances in the costs vis-à-vis benefits of patents, such as specified
requirements for patentability and the availability of compulsory licensing in
special circumstances of social need.66
The current approach to patent protection grants equal potential
protection to inventions that meet the statutory requirements of subject matter
eligibility,67 utility,68 novelty,69 and nonobviousness.70 Patentees have similar
exclusive rights to use, sell, offer for sale, and import patented inventions71 for
a limited period. Under the current regime, the same duration of patent
protection applies to all inventions. However, affording all inventors identical
rights of exclusivity, without taking into account the cost of the invention,
creates several problems.

58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
59. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018).
60. See Cotropia, After-Arising, supra note 3, at 168–71; Lemley, Ex Ante, supra note 3, at 129–30.
61. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 8.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 68, 71.
64. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018).
65. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent, 113 MICH. L.
REV. 231, 234 (2014).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The
Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 349–55 (1993) (defining common compulsory license
agreements).
67. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 102.
70. Id. § 103.
71. Id. § 154(a)(1).
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First, the current system undermines the constitutional mandate on which
it is based. Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution establishes
that “Congress shall have power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”72 But the current
one-size-fits-all system also protects low-investment inventions, incentivizing
research and development where they are not needed “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” More specifically, if an invention can be
created at a low cost, or with virtually no cost at all, no incentive is required in
order “to promote” it.73 Similarly, as such low-quality inventions typically
contribute very little to the “Progress of Science,” no constitutional mandate
exists to incentivize their creation. As one of the authors has argued elsewhere,
the current system occasionally issues patents whose development is not
dependent on the Patent Act’s pecuniary incentives.74
Second, a closely related issue arises from the fact that the current patent
system grants the same level of protection to both high- and low-quality patents,
thus failing to balance ex post costs of short-term monopoly and ex ante benefits
of higher incentives for innovation.75 The decreased competition and increased
costs associated with patent monopoly thus exceed the societal benefits from
increased innovation.76
To appreciate this point, consider the costs imposed by the current system.
Economic and legal scholarship has established that patents inflict deadweight
loss on society.77 Patentees enjoy the benefit of selling the rights to their
inventions at monopolistic prices, which are higher than competitive prices.78
This prevents the optimum balance between sellers and buyers associated with
competitive markets. Specifically, users who value the invention at more than
the competitive price but less than the monopolistic price will forgo transacting
with the patentee, consequently eliminating the potential profit the patentee
would have earned were she to sell her invention at a competitive price.79 Such
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
73. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13–14
(2005) (noting that without patent protection, “copiers would be able to appropriate much of the value
embodied in inventions without incurring the considerable costs of research and development”).
74. See Perel, Gatekeeping Function, supra note 9, at 282–88.
75. Id. at 282.
76. See David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting
Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 193–94, 196 (2009).
77. See WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, ECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 204–05
(7th ed. 2006).
78. See id.
79. See Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information: Justifications and
Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives To Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run
Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 304 (1998) (illustrating the loss
that occurs when those who value goods below the monopolistic price but above the marginal cost of
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forgone transactions impose a loss on both consumers and producers,
represented by the combined surplus the parties would have received in a
competitive market.80
Under a free competitive regime, lower investment costs associated with
invention would lower the licensing or sale price of the invention. With optimal
market conditions of full transparency and low transaction costs, the
competitive price of a good is reflected in its marginal cost of production.81 In
a perfect competitive market, a patentee who spent $100 in developing an
invention would sell her patent for exactly $100 to cover her expenses.82
However, thanks to the benefit of exclusivity ensured by patent protection, the
patentee can sell her patent for $100,000, $100,000,000, or even more as long as
she locates buyers who are willing to pay the monopolistic price. As the rich
literature on patent holdups and on rent-seeking by patent trolls explains,
agreeing to pay excessive licensing fees is not a genuine exercise of free will but
a coerced last resort.83 Since the current one-size-fits-all system of patent
protection does not align the costs of investment or value of an invention with
ultimate patent earnings, low-investment inventions impose greater deadweight
losses on society.84 To illustrate this point, consider two patents that are offered
for sale at the price of $100,000 each. The investment costs associated with
developing patent A were $1000, while the investment costs associated with
developing patent B were $50,000. This means the deadweight loss from the
low-investment invention A equals $99,000 and is therefore much larger
compared to the deadweight loss from the high-investment invention B, which
equals only $50,000. In other words, under competitive market conditions,
many more people would have been able to buy, use, and enjoy invention A
(the low-investment invention).
Of course, costs imposed by the patent system may be justified in order to
promote innovation. Thus, deadweight loss is unavoidable in monopolistic
production forgo a transaction). In a truly competitive market with optimal conditions, the competitive
price of a good is reflected in its marginal cost of production. See Robert E. Hall, The Relation Between
Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 J. POL. ECON. 921, 921 (1988).
80. MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 41–42 (2004).
81. See Calandrillo, supra note 79, at 304–05; Hall, supra note 79, at 921.
82. Importantly, the analysis here refers to the sale of the patent itself and not the sale of any
product that is based on the patent. The price of such products is determined based on the marginal
cost of production, regardless of the cost of research and development required for the creation of the
patent.
83. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991, 1993 (2007) (showing that an injunction threat can enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties
far in excess of the patent holder’s true contribution); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and
Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 541–43 (2003) (arguing that
opportunistic patent litigation by nonmanufacturing “trolls” is more common in some industries than
others).
84. Calandrillo, supra note 79, at 327–28.
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markets and might be necessary to ensure the provision of public goods. A socalled “public good” has two related characteristics: (1) nonrivalry, which means
that consumption by one person does not leave less for any other consumer, and
(2) nonexcludability, which is the high cost of excluding nonpaying
beneficiaries who consume the good.85 Nonexcludability means that the cost of
barring others from the use of the good is so high that no private profitmaximizing firm will ultimately be willing to supply it.86 As a result, the
production of public goods may be insufficient due to the relative ease and low
costs of use, as compared with production. Rational producers will not expend
resources to produce public goods in a competitive market when they cannot
make back the cost of their investment in production.87 Economists refer to this
as the “public goods problem” and suggest solving it by subsidizing the
production of underproduced goods.88 Inventions are considered public goods,
and, therefore, monopoly protection for patent rights is meant to afford
inventors the opportunity to recoup the fixed cost of invention, namely, the
initial cost of inventing the goods.89 In this way, our patent system ensures the
constant “Progress of Science and useful Arts.”90
Indeed, to justify the grant of patent rights, the monopoly costs entailed
in the deadweight loss to society must be outweighed by the social benefit of
increased innovation.91 However, with low-investment inventions, this
balancing equation seems to collapse.92 When the process of inventing depends
on relatively low monetary expenses, the inventor is likely to invent regardless
of the pecuniary incentive embedded in the right to exclude rivals from entering
the market for her invention.93 With no substantial need to recoup her costs of
85. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 73, at 13.
86. In regard to intellectual creations, Wendy Gordon identifies both an initial condition of
market failure stemming from appropriability (and its consequent free-rider problem) and a subsequent
condition due to the inabilities of users or other second comers to form markets once creators obtain
incentives to overcome the free-rider problem. See Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and
Prisoner’s Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 854–59 (1992) (discussing
conditions for market failure); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 223–24, 230–38 (1992) (discussing asymmetrical market
failure).
87. Olson, supra note 76, at 196.
88. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 108 (Denise Clinton et al.
eds., 5th ed. 2008).
89. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 36 (2004) (using intellectual
property protection, which “is a solution to the problem of covering the development cost,” as a close
analogy to the protection patent rights afford).
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
91. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813,
1824–25 (1984).
92. Perel, Gatekeeping Function, supra note 9, at 287–88.
93. See Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian Foundation of
Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 898, 921, 951 (2009) (suggesting that there is no need for
an incentive when no pecuniary resources were necessary for innovation).
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invention, the inventor will invent so long as the prospective invention is
anticipated to increase her personal utility.94
Most importantly, the social costs of patents protecting low-investment
inventions outweigh the benefits of such patents to society. If the cost of
creating an invention is low, society achieves only a small gain from the fact
that the patent system incentivizes an inventor to make this small investment.
On the other hand, the patent system still forces society to pay a high
monopolistic price for this small social benefit, assuming there is a demand for
the product.95 The social benefit does not outweigh a monopolistic price for
low-cost inventions because society effectively overpays for something it could
have obtained at a low price in a competitive market. So long as all patents
receive identical statutory protection, they all generate profits for their owners.
Society pays for these profits. Yet, the fact that society pays equally to promote
all inventions, regardless of their respective investments, introduces
inefficiency.
To illustrate this problem, consider the following stylized example.
Assume a manufacturer requires the use of two separate patented inventions in
order to manufacture its main product. The first invention, owned by Patentee
A, required a significant investment of $1,000,000. The second invention,
owned by Patentee B, required an investment of only $1000. Yet, if both
inventions are necessary to the manufacturer, and assuming no substitutes for
either are available, the manufacturer will have to buy both at a price that has
nothing to do with the initial investment required for the creation of each
invention. Both patentees have the power to bar the manufacturer from
producing its main product and can thus demand high monopolistic prices for
the use of their patents. For instance, both patentees can demand a payment of
$1,000,000 for the manufacturer’s license to use their patents. This means the
manufacturer’s product will be much more expensive for consumers than it
might have been if Patentee B was not awarded patent protection.
This illustration leads to the third problem raised by the current one-sizefits-all system. It distorts the incentive structure, frequently making
development of low-investment inventions more profitable for inventors. In
the example above, it is easy to see how the profits of Patentee B, who invested
less, will be exponentially greater than those of Patentee A, who invested more
in his invention. Both are offered the same power vis-à-vis the manufacturer,
even though Patentee A bore a much greater investment.

94. See id. at 927–28.
95. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 240. This is excluding “pirate” companies that
simply elect to ignore patents and take their chances in court, hoping that they can avoid infringement
or invalidate the patent. See id.; cf. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST . L. REV. 19, 21–
22.

98 N.C. L. REV. 481 (2020)

2020]

RECOUPMENT PATENT

495

If identical protection and potentially similar earning opportunities
compensate for smaller and larger investments in research and development
alike, rational inventors will likely minimize their investment costs and develop
low-investment inventions.96 This is especially true in light of currently thriving
patent monetization opportunities. Owners of low-investment patents can
always hold up inventors downstream to maximize profit or otherwise engage
in profitable litigation practices.97 At the same time, when enormous
investments in research and development are required to develop a new
invention, the current twenty-year protection period may not suffice to
incentivize inventors.98 This means that potential inventors will often refrain
from inventing goods and services beneficial to society. This problem is
especially pronounced in the context of the pharmaceutical industry, where
firms are often unable to recoup their multibillion dollar research and
development (“R&D”) investment under the standard twenty-year patent
protection.99
Moreover, since the current one-size-fits-all system of patent protection
does not afford extra points or favorable protection for extensive investments
in invention, inventors are effectively encouraged to minimize their overall
research expenses as much as possible, consequently yielding low-quality
inventions.100 This, in turn, obviously reduces social welfare, as society is
deprived of the benefit of high-value inventions. However, were patentees
awarded protection that coincides with their investment, as we propose here,
inventors would have a greater incentive to engage in complex, expensive, and,
most importantly, valuable inventive activities.
The fourth problem arising from the current one-size-fits-all approach
relates to its vulnerability to abuse by manipulative players in the patent
ecosystem. Allowing patent owners to obtain licensing revenues highly
96. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 239–40.
97. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 1992–93.
98. See Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation
Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 181–82 (discussing the
expensive and lengthy process of drug development that would not be worthwhile for investors without
a protection period).
99. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 3–4, 136–37, 204 n.1.
100. Arguably, the abandonment of constructive reduction to practice and the practice of early
filing necessary for entrepreneurs seeking funding is also reducing initial research expenses. See, e.g., 2
JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 13:31 (2d ed. 2015)
(“[B]ecause writing patent applications is often less expensive and time-consuming than doing actual
research, the law creates an incentive to file patent applications describing inventions before actual
research involving them has been completed, and perhaps even begun. This constructive reduction to
practice concept creates incentives to seek patents on purely theoretical designs and even guesses, rather
than empirically tested, proven designs.”). But see Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. D AVIS L.
REV. 663, 716–17 (2019) (explaining why inventors might be better off investing in research in order
to create working examples of their invention rather than filing early with a prophetic example of the
invention).

98 N.C. L. REV. 481 (2020)

496

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

exceeding their investment could hamper the ability of downstream innovators
to fully commercialize the benefit of their knowledge.101 Because all patentees
enjoy a similar potential to extract unlimited earnings during the twenty years
of patent duration, they are free to generate income far in excess of their
investment through injunctive threats and holdups.102 For a defendant who has
already invested heavily in developing and commercializing her product, which
allegedly includes an infringing feature, agreeing to excessive royalties is
probably the most economical way for the defendant to respond.103 Otherwise,
if the patent is found to be valid and infringed, the injunction will generally be
effective immediately, forcing the defendant to instantly stop commercializing
her product.104 By generating income through aggressive licensing and litigation
instead of commercialization, such patent trolling ultimately hinders
subsequent innovation at a cost to social welfare.
Yet, if what patentees were to receive for the technology they create
reasonably resembled their actual investment, improper injunctive threats and
strategic holdups could be drastically reduced.105 If, as we suggest here,
patentees were limited to recouping what they had originally invested, plus a
fixed percentage of profit, we could restrict their ability to demand excessive
licensing fees and effectively control their bargaining power. Because the
investment originally made in the patent would become both transparent (the
patentee’s declared costs would be made publicly available) and known at the
time of issuance, prospective licensees could not be pressed to pay extremely
unreasonable fees for the exploitation of protected inventions.106
A fifth and closely related problem is the anticommons dynamic prevalent
in the current system.107 Anticommons refers to the issue of overfragmentation
of property rights.108 Thus, an anticommons problem is created when too many
owners hold rights that allow them to exclude others from a given asset.109 In
101. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 2009–10.
102. Id. at 2009.
103. Id. at 1992–93.
104. See Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To),
48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 153–54 (2007).
105. Id. at 154.
106. See infra Part II.
107. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 75–77 (describing the anticommons challenges of the
patent system); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998) (defining an anticommons as a situation in which
“multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective
privilege of use”).
108. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698–99 (1998) (discussing the effect that anticommons property
has on biomedical research); Rai, supra note 98, at 192–94 (discussing how pharmaceutical companies
often struggle to develop new treatments due to an inability to reach agreements with patent holders).
109. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 76 (“The anticommons is characterized by fragmented
property rights that must be aggregated to make effective use of the property.”).
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the patent context, this is often the case when several different patents cover
different elements that must be integrated in order to create one product or if
different patents cover different steps in a cumulative innovative process.110
These anticommons easily lead to bargaining breakdowns whenever the
development of a product requires permission from the owners of two or more
elements.111 In a more specific example, anticommons theory is highly relevant
to DNA sequence patents,112 where patentees currently hold hundreds of patents
on DNA sequences that cover specific genes or fragments of genes.113 Any
particular use of these patents will likely require the accumulation of many
patents by one owner leading to anticommons problems.114 In such cases,
innovation can be impeded if permission from too many patentee right-holders
is required in order to produce or develop a new product.115 This problem is
exacerbated under the current one-size-fits-all patent system, as the
proliferation of multiple low-investment and low-quality patents contributes to
the creation of anticommons in the patent system. If patent quality is improved,
and, as we suggest, protection is granted only to patentees that made high
investments, many anticommons will subsequently disappear.

110. Id.
111. Id. (“Aggregating such fragmented property rights entails high search and negotiation costs
to locate and bargain with the many rights owners whose permissions are necessary to complete broader
development. This type of licensing environment may quickly become dominated by ‘holdouts’ that
refuse to license their component unless paid to do so. Because a given project will fail without their
cooperation, ‘holdouts’ may demand a bribe close to the value of the entire project.”); see Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic Material: A Counter-Proposal to Richard Epstein’s
Steady Course, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 195, 197–98
(F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (describing research “blockades”); Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20
J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 356 (1991). See generally MANCUR O LSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1961) (articulating disincentives to collective action). Different anticommons theorists
suggest that the solution to this problem is either to consolidate ownership in a single owner or to
preclude patent protection altogether for certain types of inventions, particularly upstream patent
research tools. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 77; Philippe Jacobs & Geertrui Van Overwalle,
Opinion, Gene Patents: A Different Approach, 23 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 505, 505 (2001); Arti K. Rai,
Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 838 (2001); cf. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996) (arguing for
organized private transactional mechanisms).
112. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 86; cf. Dan L. Burk, Introduction: A Biotechnology Primer,
55 U. PITT . L. REV. 611, 621–28 (1994) (describing the wide variety of commercial biotechnological
applications).
113. See, e.g., S.M. Thomas et al., Commentary, Ownership of the Human Genome, 380 NATURE
387, 387–88 (1996).
114. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reaching Through the Genome, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES
OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 111, at 266.
115. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 86–89 (analyzing the anticommons theory in the context
of biotechnology and DNA sequence patents).
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The issue of patent thickets is closely related to the anticommons
problem.116 Patent thickets can be thought of as an extreme version of the
anticommons problem, when an accumulation of overlapping patents covers a
single product in a way that can potentially choke an industry.117 Patent thickets
are naturally and inevitably created in the current system when different
inventors make small cumulative contributions to the same product.118 As time
goes by, it becomes nearly impossible to pierce the patent thicket and secure
patentee consent, which is necessary for continued innovation.119 Our proposal,
limiting patent protection for patentees who have made small contributions to
a product, offers a direct solution to this type of problem. Patent thickets are
also created when patent offices err in the issuing process, unintentionally
granting overlapping patents to several inventors.120 In the current patent
system, such mistakes are a byproduct of the low quality of patents and their
great number, which overwhelm patent offices. Our proposal, aimed at
improving patent quality, will therefore also help reduce this type of patent
thicket.
II. THE PROPOSED MODEL
The following discussion introduces in detail our proposed recoupmentpatent regime as an alternative to the current one-size-fits-all system. Our
model aims to adhere closely to the economic rationale for intellectual property
protection in general and patent protection specifically and offers remedies to
many of the challenges discussed in classical patent theories.
A.

Theoretical Background: The Importance of Investment in Light of Patent
Theory

Traditionally, the theoretical justification for the patent regime centers on
incentives for innovation.121 The current patent system incentivizes innovation
by providing inventors with a twenty-year period of market exclusivity, thereby
allowing them to benefit from their investment. This economic rationale for
patent protection suggests that, in the absence of patent protection, inventors
cannot prevent others from copying their inventions and that, as a result, others
can exploit their work for free.122 If inventors cannot benefit fully from their
116. See id. at 77–78, 89–92.
117. See Shapiro, supra note 14, at 121.
118. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 90.
119. Id. at 78 (“Like the anticommons problem, the patent thicket has the potential to prevent all
parties from making a final product that incorporates multiple inventions.”).
120. Id. (suggesting that “[b]ecause patent examiners spend very little time with each patent,
patents regularly issue that would not withstand more searching scrutiny, and indeed nearly half of all
litigated patents are held invalid”).
121. Id. at 66–68.
122. See id. (describing the widely agreed-upon utilitarian theory of patent law).
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inventions, they will lack sufficient incentive to invest time, effort, and money
in developing new tools and ideas.123 Our proposal, focusing on the investment
of patentees in developing their ideas and products, thus easily follows in light
of the most basic premise of patent law theory.
Extrapolating from this basic premise, scholars have fine-tuned accounts
of the intricate connection between patent protection, economic incentive, and
innovation.124 Kenneth Arrow famously argued for narrow patent protection in
order to minimize interference with competition and innovation.125 He
emphasized that patents delay downstream innovation and thus should grant
patentees as little protection as possible.126 This position stems from Arrow’s
general view, endorsing competition as the best means to spur innovation. 127
The underlying assumption here is that companies in a competitive marketplace
will innovate in order to avoid losing out to competitors while monopolists lack
such incentive. Therefore, Arrow’s argument proposes limited patent
protection in order to minimize associated monopolies.128 Our proposal
complements Arrow’s prescriptive argument, as it endorses narrow patents,
thereby creating short-term instead of long-term monopolies when possible.
Other economists and legal scholars have offered similar theories focusing
on cumulative innovation, where a new product is the result of multiple
improvements to an initial invention.129 Robert Merges and Richard Nelson
have proposed a model that tries to allocate rights among initial inventors and
those who develop subsequent improvements.130 Their theory of tailored
incentives recognizes the importance of intellectual property rights and the
incentives such rights offer both initial inventors and subsequent contributors
to the innovation.131 The tailored incentives approach attends more closely to
the particular allocation of rights to both initial and supplementary inventors.132
It argues that granting patents to both will normally balance incentives correctly
but that in some cases the balance should be struck based on the relative
123. Another utilitarian justification for granting patents is encouraging the disclosure of
inventions that might otherwise be kept secret. Id. at 66.
124. See id. at 68–75 (outlining multiple theories of the patent system).
125. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 617 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962);
see also F. M. SCHERER & D AVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 660 (3d ed. 1990); Mark L. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 960–61 (2001).
126. Arrow, supra note 125, at 619–20.
127. Id.
128. See Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Intellectual Property, 92 AM. ECON.
REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 209, 209 (2002).
129. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 73–75.
130. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 876–79 (1990).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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importance of the initial invention and subsequent improvement.133 Our
proposal fits the dictates of their theory, as it allows different levels of
protection for different patentees based on the levels of investment involved in
their contributions to the invention as a whole. Thus, in light of the
complexities introduced by theories of competitive innovation, cumulative
innovation, anticommons, and patent thickets, basing patent protection on
investment is worth exploring.
In his own theoretical writing, Ted Sichelman provides a detailed account
of the different phases in the development of an invention.134 He emphasizes
that “[i]nnovation isn’t instant” and “involves numerous steps, many of which
are fraught with uncertainty and great expense,”135 then identifies several major
phases in the innovative process.136 The first phase is where the inventor
identifies a problem that needs to be solved.137 This process can be costly and
labor intensive.138 The second phase involves the moment of conception and
development of a working prototype.139 Conception is understood as the
instance of “formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent
idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in
practice.”140 Following conception, as long as the inventor files a patent
application that offers a useful, novel, and nonobvious solution, the invention
will qualify for patenting.141 “In reality, there is usually no single moment of
conception but rather a series of steps that refine a potential solution.” 142
Because patent law does not require a working prototype for a patent, a
133. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 75.
134. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 347–54 (2010); see also
Emmett W. Eldred & Michael E. McGrath, Commercializing New Technology – I, RES. TECH. MGMT .,
Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 41, 41 (“Promising new technologies are not magically transformed into products;
they need to be developed to the point where they are ready for commercialization.”).
135. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 347–48.
136. Id. at 347–54. Note that the innovation process varies across industries and firms within
industries. For a more sophisticated account of the innovation process, see OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-BP-ITC-165, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 31–60 (1995), https://ota.fas.org/reports/9539.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2HLW-UN9D].
137. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 348–49; see also Stephen J. Kline & Nathan Rosenberg, An
Overview of Innovation, in THE POSITIVE SUM STRATEGY 275, 289–94, 289 fig.2, 290 fig.3 (Ralph
Landau & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 1986) (suggesting that the first stage of innovation is identifying a
need in a potential market).
138. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 348.
139. Id. at 349–50.
140. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs.,
Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Conception is the touchstone of inventorship.”);
Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 72 (2009)
[hereinafter Cotropia, Folly] (“Conception, the first step of inventing, involves the mental formation
of the complete invention.”).
141. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018).
142. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 350.
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continuum contains the identification of the problem to the building of a
working prototype upon which the single marker of conception can be placed.143
Once this phase is complete, usually a patent application can be filed and
granted.144 The third phase, following the conception and prototypedevelopment phase, is the stage of transforming a prototype into a commercial
product.145 In general, a company will undertake significant market testing to
determine how to build a commercially successful product.146 Often, the capital
required for the market testing and product commercialization phase is
substantial.147 However, unlike the risks and costs associated with invention, “a
patent does not directly protect the information generated during market
testing and subsequent marketing,”148 creating an ex ante disincentive to engage
in these activities.149
Subsequent phases relating to the development of inventions are
distribution and product improvement.150 Once a sale is made, the product is
distributed to customers.151 Innovative and patented distribution methods can
also introduce high costs to patentees who wish to commercialize their

143. NATHAN ROSENBERG, PERSPECTIVES ON TECHNOLOGY 192 (1976); Sichelman, supra note
134, at 350–51; .
144. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 350–51 (explaining that this is “because of the reward theory’s
preference for early patenting and the weak disclosure standards applied by the Patent Office”); see
Cotropia, Folly, supra note 140, at 73. But see, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200,
1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding conception only upon the building of a working prototype).
145. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 351–52; see also VIJAY K. JOLLY, COMMERCIALIZING NEW
TECHNOLOGIES 6 (1997); T OM KELLY & J ONATHAN LITTMAN, THE ART OF INNOVATION 103–11
(2001) (describing the importance of prototyping to product development by highlighting stories from
IDEO and Amazon).
146. See Sichelman, supra note 134, at 351–52; see also Robert G. Cooper & Elko J. Kleinschmidt,
An Investigation into the New Product Process: Steps, Deficiencies, and Impact, 3 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION
MGMT. 71, 75–76 & exhibit 2 (1986) (finding that in a study of over 200 new product launches, over
25% included a detailed marketing study and nearly 77% of the launches included a preliminary market
assessment).
147. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 351; see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 277 (1977) (“[M]arketing is a major cost in innovation.”).
148. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 351–52.
149. Id.; see also Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 339 (2008) (recognizing that a potential deficiency of patent
law is its failure to protect “market experimentation” directly); Kitch, supra note 147, at 276–77 (noting
that investments in development of the invention “can be large and produce information . . . that would
be appropriable by competitors absent the original patent”); cf. Mohanbir Sawhney et al., The 12
Different Ways for Companies To Innovate, 47 M.I.T. SLOAN MGMT. REV. 75, 75–76, 81 (2006) (noting
that “[i]n actuality, ‘business innovation’ is far broader in scope than product or technological
innovation” and “takes considerable effort and time”).
150. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 352–54; see also Kline & Rosenberg, supra note 137, at 289
(describing the fifth stage in the innovation process as bringing new products and processes to market).
151. Distribution includes both physical shipping methods and digital routing methods.
Sichelman, supra note 134, at 352 n.67.
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inventions.152 Furthermore, soon after a product is launched, the company
selling the product or some different entity may develop an improvement of
the invention.153 Under patent law, these improved products often fall under
the scope of the patent covering the original product as well as qualifying for
separate patent protection.154 If a party independent of the original patentee
creates the patentable improvement, the problem of “blocking patents” arises. 155
The second patent holder is blocked from making and selling the improved
product by the first patent, and the first patent holder is blocked from doing
the same by the second patent.156 If the transaction costs of conducting the deal
are lower than the benefit of the improvement, the two patent holders would
presumably “come to an agreement and share the profits.”157 However, “if
transaction costs are high, the improvement may never be developed.”158 This
in turn may add additional costs to the development and commercialization of
inventions.
Sichelman’s description of the different stages of innovation ties into our
argument in two important ways. First, it highlights the fact that a single
process or product may require multiple stages of development and therefore a
multiplicity of patents. If patent protection should depend on the level of
investment, this can help solve the problems of patent thickets and patent
anticommons that often result from this multiplicity. Second, Sichelman’s
description emphasizes the many types of costs that inventors face, thereby
stressing the need to consider such investments seriously as part of the process
of patent application and issuance. Our proposed model suggests that all the
types of investment listed by Sichelman should be considered in determining
appropriate patent duration.
Edmund Kitch offers an alternative theory to patent protection that
focuses on the ex post benefits of patent protection.159 In his view, absent patent
protection, an invention has no owner, and thus no one has an incentive to

152. Id. at 353; see also Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1034 (2004).
153. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 353; see also JOLLY, supra note 145, at 12.
154. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 353; see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 130, at 860–61.
155. Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 80 (1994); Merges & Nelson, supra note 130, at 860–62 (explaining the
phenomenon of blocking patents).
156. Merges, supra note 155, at 80; Sichelman, supra note 134, at 353.
157. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 353; see also Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent
Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 871–72 (2007).
158. Sichelman, supra note 134, at 354; see also Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 157, at 872 (“On
the margin, the higher fees may not leave enough profits to justify the investment in the innovation.”).
159. Kitch, supra note 147, at 265 (offering a new theory of the patent system that he believed
would “reintegrate[] the patent institution with the general theory of property rights”).

98 N.C. L. REV. 481 (2020)

2020]

RECOUPMENT PATENT

503

invest in developing it further.160 This is a classic “tragedy of the commons” or
anticommons situation, as the common property or ownerless asset (in this case
the invention) is not optimally managed.161 “Kitch’s prospect theory strongly
emphasizes the role of a single patentee in coordinating the development,
implementation, and improvement of an invention.”162 By granting ownership
to the patentee, patents encourage downstream investment and innovation after
a patent is granted. This account differs from traditional economic theory of
patent law, as it suggests that patent monopoly is an advantage instead of a
disadvantage, and focuses on encouraging investment ex post, after a patent was
granted, rather than ex ante, before the patent is granted.163 Our proposal offers
benefits according to this theoretical perspective as well, despite the fact that
Kitch’s theory is markedly different from other accounts described above and is
therefore highly controversial. As we demonstrate below, our proposal includes
mechanisms that allow consideration of investments occurring after the patent
is granted and can thus also offer advantages under Kitch’s ex post theory of
patent law while not providing the patentee prohibitively strong monopoly
power.
B.

Investment-Based Patent

The starting point for our analysis is the undisputedly low quality of
patents in the existing system. Currently, estimates suggest that only around
10% of patents issued in the United States are of high economic value.164 These
estimates are based on renewal fee data.165 Renewal at the twelve-year mark is
another indicator of high-value patents.166 In the United States, patents are
eligible for renewal during years three, seven, and eleven from the date of
issue.167 Current data suggest that only about 40% of issued patents are renewed
in the last period.168 Many of those renewed patents are renewed for crosslicensing purposes.169 Thus, low-value inventions account for the great majority
of issued patents.170
160. Id. at 276–77; see also Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and
Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 473 (1992): Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase,
and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2660–61 (1994).
161. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 69–72.
162. Id. at 71.
163. Id. at 69.
164. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 100 (reviewing empirical data pertaining to U.S.
patent value and showing that “the majority of patents are not worth more than a few thousand
dollars”).
165. Id. at 99–100.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 99.
168. Id. at 100.
169. See id. at 115–17.
170. Id. at 100–01.
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To solve these problems, we suggest that some deeper form of inquiry into
patent quality is needed at the stage of patent application. Thus, under our
proposed investment-based regime, patentees will continue filing for patents as
they currently do. However, instead of receiving a fixed, twenty-year protection
period, a patentee will be granted a protection period that will enable her to
recoup her declared investment, as supported by evidence, plus an additional
fixed percentage of profit. The applicant will be obliged to file investment
recoupment reports upon renewals to ensure protection until she fully recoups
her investment and additional fixed profits. For example, a pharmaceutical
company will be able to file for its investment in developing a specific drug,
recouping its high development costs, which can be as high as 2.4 billion dollars
per drug, including failed attempts at development, which are currently not
fully subsidized.171 This will make the existing regimes for the extension of
pharmaceutical patents, which are clumsy and complex due to regulatory
approval delays, redundant and unnecessary.172 Such a tailored regime will allow
the company to recoup its investment while profiting, thus incentivizing
companies to undertake the high costs involved in drug development.
Conversely, a company engaged in developing computer software will be able
to recoup its investment without receiving an excessive twenty-year term of
protection unnecessary to recoup its presumably lower investment.173
While the patent applicant will have to document the actual and
anticipated investment both in advance and upon filing for the patent, her
investment can be updated during the lifetime of the patent to reflect the
patentee’s actual investment. This feature of the model is critical because patent
applications are usually filed at an early phase in the life of the invention174 in
order to preempt others under the first-to-file patent regime.
We propose that payment of filing and renewal fees be deferred to a point
in time when the patentee actually makes an income, rather than being due
immediately upon filing when the patentee does not necessarily have any
income. Such an approach allows all patentees, especially entrepreneurial
entities such as small startup companies with very little income, time to develop

171. It is estimated that the total time spent from the beginning of a research project to the
marketing of a successful drug is twelve to fifteen years, 1.8 years of which is due to the FDA approval
process. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 204 n.1. Estimates of the average costs of drug development
and testing range from $150 million to over $800 million. Id. For more recent drug development
estimates, see Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug Development:
Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420–32 (2006). See also Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth
of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 258 (2012).
172. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 3–4, 136–37.
173. See id. at 84–85 (“The software industry also has relatively low fixed costs and a short time to
market.”).
174. Cotropia, Folly, supra note 140, at 68–70.
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income sources that will allow them to pay the relatively high fees in turn.
However, some basic fees will be paid upon filing in order to sponsor the patent
prosecution process within the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”).175
Our proposal is centered on the U.S. market. However, it may be applied
internationally and is in line with current regional and international trends
calling for regional and global patent protection.176 For example, the European
Patent Office (“EPO”) offers a regional scheme for patent protection for the
Contracting States to the European Patent Convention.177 The major advantage
of this scheme is that the EPO provides a single patent grant procedure.
Therefore, the patents granted are not European Union patents or even Europewide patents but a bundle of national patents that need to be separately enforced
at the national level. If our model is applied internationally, it should be
uniform and introduce a unitary reporting scheme for investment recoupment.
Importantly, our proposal is aimed at offering tailored incentives. Therefore, if
applied internationally, recoupment should be measured internationally. This
means that if a patentee manages to recoup her investment, plus the designated
level of profits in a certain country, she will not be able to apply for a patent
elsewhere. If a patentee applies simultaneously for patent protection in many
countries, she can recoup her investment from all of them; all patents will expire
once she recoups her investment and profits. Such international investment
recoupment has clear advantages over domestic recoupment. First, this means
that in many cases it will not be worthwhile for patentees to file in multiple
jurisdictions, thus saving significant administrative costs. Second, to maximize
profits, most patentees will elect to recoup their investment in developed
economies; this means that inventions will typically fall into the public domain
much earlier in developing countries, thus resulting in distributional advantages
and cheaper access to inventions.178

175. USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., (Jan. 1, 2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-feeschedule#Patent%20Fees [https://perma.cc/NVK6-TXZR] (listing patent application filings
fees).
176. See generally Amir H. Khoury, The End of the National Patent Office, 52 IDEA 197, 199–200
(2012) (introducing a global patent while suggesting abolishing national patent protection regimes);
The European Patent Convention, EUR. PAT. O FF. (June 2016), https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legaltexts/epc.html [https://perma.cc/2XV6-VBG9] (describing the European Patent Office’s period of
implementation including the goal of centralization).
177. See European Patent Guide: How To Get a European Patent, EUR. PAT. OFF.,
https://www.epo.org/applying/European/Guide-for-applicants/html/e/ga_c2_3.html
[https://perma.cc/77GH-2CR8] (explaining how the European Patent Convention provides regional
patent protection for all of Europe).
178. See Carlos M. Correa, The Push for Stronger Enforcement Rules: Implications for Developing
Countries, in ICTSD, ISSUE PAPER NO. 22, THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27, 31 (2009).
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More generally, our proposal seeks to create a more balanced transaction
between the inventor and the public.179 The traditional one-size-fits-all deal is
inherently unfair to both high-investment patentees and the public. Highinvestment patentees do not always get their fair share of the value of their
inventions, and downstream inventors are often required to pay high prices for
inventions even if they are of low quality and low investment. Our proposed
regime introduces greater fairness regarding the patentee’s reward and incentive
structures.
Under such a regime, we believe patent quality will greatly improve. This
change will resolve, or at least minimize, many of the existing challenges within
the patent system. Patent quality will improve as fewer low-investment patents
are filed. Additionally, the phenomenon of patent trolls might disappear or be
minimized under such conditions because such patent holders will not be able
to establish high investment for their inventions. Moreover, such a regime
offers important information about the costs incurred in developing the
invention. Such information affords important data for licensing and litigation
purposes and can greatly prevent high licensing and litigation costs, therefore
reducing information costs and transaction costs pertaining to patents filed
under such a regime.
This approach also incentivizes patentees to commercialize inventions and
bring them to market.180 When a patentee knows that she can recoup her
investment, she will have greater incentive to move forward with
commercializing her invention. If we allow patentees to update their investment
during the life of the patent application or the issued patent, we will see more
commercialization compared to current commercialization rates, which are very
low.181
C.

Risks and Safeguards

The model we propose will be accompanied by various safeguards
designed to prevent abuse, such as falsification or useless spending. Under this
regime, companies would arguably be incentivized to report higher investment
so that they can recoup higher returns. In order to address this concern, the
following safety valves will be introduced: first, application and renewal fees
will be keyed to the declared investment. Patentees will thus be required to pay
179. Patent protection is perceived as a second-best bargain between the public and the inventor,
where the inventor provides the public with a disclosure of the invention in return for exclusivity for
a limited time. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 66 (discussing the secondary utilitarian justification
for patent law, which is encouraging the disclosure of inventions that might otherwise be kept secret).
180. See generally Sichelman, supra note 134, at 341 (discussing the low rates of patent
commercialization and proposing a new commercialization patent, granted in exchange for the
commitment to make and sell a substantially novel product).
181. Id. at 343–47.
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application and renewal fees that stand in relation to the level of protection they
claim. To prevent abuse, fees will be calibrated to the level of investment. This
flexible method for calculating filing and renewal fees will disincentivize flawed
reporting. Furthermore, to the extent that several patent filings originate from
the same research investment, the total investment will be divided in accordance
with the number of filings, and each patentee will declare an equal portion of
the total investment. Second, upon litigation and licensing of the patent, a
patentee will bear the burden of proof to establish the level of investment, which
will be the basis for calculating both damages and royalties.182 Such a burden
will also contribute to the disincentivizing of flawed reporting. Additionally,
beyond these two major safeguards, many existing schemes guarantee honest
reporting of investment. For example, state and federal income tax filings,183
SEC filings,184 publicly traded companies’ regulatory reporting schemes,185
private companies’ by-laws and reporting requirements,186 etc., will impede false
reporting. If a patentee knows that different reporting schemes will verify her
statements, she will hesitate to abuse the system. This is especially valuable
when looking at very high investment patents such as pharmaceutical patents.
Most pharmaceutical companies and major technology companies are publicly
traded187 so false reporting is not a real concern, especially given these additional
oversight tools.
The risk of false reporting may be aggravated in the case of global
corporations because such corporations can attribute greater investment to a
certain patent or attribute a certain investment to a few patent applications,
especially if a recoupment model is adopted internationally. Similar reporting
challenges came up in the context of the international taxation of global
corporations with regard to transfer prices.188 These challenges have been
addressed by introducing a unified reporting scheme, which is workable and has

182. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Adjusting Patent Damages for Nonpatent Incentives, 26 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 187–88 (2017).
183. Tax filings require detailed reports pertaining to all aspects of a company’s business
operations. See generally Jeffrey A. Dubin & Louis L. Wilde, An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income Tax
Auditing and Compliance, 41 NAT’L T AX J. 61 (1988) (discussing tax compliance issues and the
effectiveness of tax filings, audits, and the IRS in ensuring accurate disclosure).
184. On the significance of SEC filings, see generally Earl K. Stice, The Market Reaction to 10-K
and 10-Q Filings and to Subsequent The Wall Street Journal Earnings Announcements, 66 ACCT. REV. 42
(1991).
185. On the role of such requirements, see generally Ray Ball, Infrastructure Requirements for an
Economically Efficient System of Public Financial Reporting and Disclosure, 2001 BROOKINGS-WHARTON
PAPERS ON FIN. SERVS. 127, 127.
186. See id. (sketching the principal infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient
system of public financial reports and disclosure).
187. See generally David J. Denis & Atulya Sarin, Ownership and Board Structures in Publicly Traded
Corporations, 52 J. F IN. ECON. 187 (1999) (analyzing numerous different publicly traded corporations).
188. TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY 27–30 (2018).
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proven to be successful.189 If our recoupment regime is adopted internationally
or by a large number of countries, a unified reporting scheme can be introduced
and offer yet another safeguard against misstatements of investment.
Another question that must be addressed pertains to the precise definition
of “investment.” The proposed regime must be based on a clear understanding
of what constitutes investment and why we should employ it as a measure to fix
the term for patent protection. For our purposes, investment includes any
expense incurred in the process of research and development of the invention,
which has been described in greater detail above.190 Such expenses can differ
greatly based on the type of the technology and can vary significantly among
different patenting entities (corporations, individuals, etc.). Research and
development costs, as well as any other costs involved in inventing, should be
taken into account. Such costs may include employee salaries, equipment and
materials, lab services, consulting services, administrative costs, regulatory
costs, commercialization costs, and other costs incurred while developing an
invention. Investment serves as a good basis for determining recoupment and a
generally good way to protect inventors because it is probably the only
measurable variable directly relating to the invention.191 Investment is also very
responsive to the basic economic rationale for justifying patent protection. This
suggests that if patentees are afforded the ability to recoup their investment,
invention will take place with proper economic incentives.
Allowing recoupment of investment might incentivize inefficient
investment in research and development because patentees know they can
recoup their incurred investment regardless of their efficiency. Moreover, there
may be some concern that a recoupment regime will incentivize patentees to
slow down product sales in order to extend the duration of recoupment and, as
a result, the duration of the patent monopoly. These two concerns are not
significant because patentees have a natural incentive to recoup their
investment and profit as quickly as possible, especially in light of possible
market competition. Therefore, there is little risk that they will try to slow the
recoupment process. Moreover, in most cases, patentees cannot really control
the success of their products, their respective sales, and the pace of sales.192
Lastly, patentees will generally try to economize their costs and not overinvest
in research and development, especially when they have limited knowledge
189. See id. at 156–58.
190. See supra Section II.A.
191. Mainly, investment is easier to measure relative to other factors, such as invention-value. See
Janet Freilich, The Uninformed Topography of Patent Scope, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 150, 162 (2015)
(pointing out the difficulties in assessing the value of inventions ex ante).
192. There are some exceptional cases in which companies might be able to control the pace of
sales. For example, brand-name pharmaceutical companies will often stop selling their drugs just before
generic companies would be able to enter the market. Since generic drugs can only be prescribed if
there is an approved brand-name drug, this ends up preventing generic entry.
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regarding future income from the sales of their invention, or when they face
pressure from competitors in the race to be the first to patent the invention.
Another possible concern is that introducing this new patent regime might
incentivize inventors to rely on trade secrecy and avoid patent protection
altogether. The proposed model might thereby undermine the goal of
encouraging the disclosure of inventions that might otherwise be kept secret.
These concerns are unrealistic, and it is unlikely that the proposed model will
change existing incentives to rely on trade secrecy and patents because the
decision on which protection scheme to utilize is complex and depends on many
considerations.193 When applicants can safely rely on trade secrecy, they will not
file a patent application, regardless of the specifics of the patent regime in
place.194 Conversely, when applicants cannot maintain secrecy, they will have to
apply for a patent.195 The proposed model offers a more tailored and fair regime
to all patentees and removes the distortion created by the one-size-fits-all
regime. If an invention is the fruit of significant labor, the applicant will have
incentives in place to apply for patent protection in order to recoup her
investment. Additionally, very few scientists obtain technical knowledge from
patents, and scientists at many companies are actually discouraged from reading
patents.196 Therefore, the informational value of patent documents is less
significant than one might imagine it to be.
D.

Spark-of-Genius Inventions and Value-Based Patents

A possible objection to our investment-based approach is that inventions
might be the product of accidental innovation, spark of genius, or other actions
that do not necessarily reflect high investment of resources. However, this
objection is overstated. First, it is currently estimated that only a very small
fraction of inventions, around 0.5%, represent spark-of-genius inventions that
reflect both low investment and high value.197 In some sectors, such as business
methods or information technologies, this estimate is probably 1% of issued
patents.198 Second, even if an invention supposedly represents a spark of genius,
it might still be priced highly when one estimates the actual dollar investment
required to create it. For example, if a gifted employee comes up with an
invention that is of great economic value by a spark of genius, we may assume
that this employee’s costs would reflect her innovative capabilities.

193. See David S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets?, 94 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 751, 754–70, 797–801 (2018) (discussing the multitude of considerations that drive startups to
use trade secrecy).
194. Id. at 810.
195. Id. at 770–73.
196. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 66.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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Additionally, we can adopt a flexible measure to assess the investment in such
rare cases by including employee education, training, and other contributions
in the investment that can be recouped because capacity to innovate stems from
a large set of factors. Third, even if spark-of-genius inventions do exist, it does
not follow that they merit increased patent protection. In fact, if such inventions
do not require investment, there is no need to incentivize them, so the principal
rationale for patent protection is missing. Thus, the mere fact that an accidental
invention contributed to society does not mean the inventor is entitled to this
accidental benefit at the expense of all others.
Nevertheless, to reflect the contribution of these inventors to society, one
might still wish to reward spark-of-genius inventors regardless of the need to
incentivize investment. We show that this can be done, using some of the
valuation methods described below, which are designed to estimate the value of
an invention rather than the investment required to create it. Under such a
regime, patentees might have a choice between an investment-based route, as
described above, or a value-based route. Under the value-based route, the
economic value of an invention (as opposed to its investment) will be assessed
at the time of patent application, and the protection period will be determined
according to this value. The patentee will have to pay a fixed fee for the
valuation of her invention. This approach offers the inventor a fair reward for
the economic value of her invention at the time of issuance. Similar to the model
proposed above regarding an investment-based approach, such a scheme should
also include built-in safety valves, such as filing and renewal fees, which are
keyed to the economic value of the invention. Under such a two-tier system,
which offers two routes for patent protection—investment-based and valuebased patents—the incentive to file for a patent can be summarized as follows:
Invention
Value
High

Inventor
Investment
High

High
Low
Low

Low
Low
High

Patent Filing Route
Either investment-based or value-based filing,
whichever is higher
Value-based filing
Probably no filing
Investment-based filing or no filing

This two-tier regime provides incentive to file for patent protection if the
patent required high investment, is of high economic value, or both. However,
while we show that such a regime is possible, we do not advocate its use. As we
show below, the value of an invention (as opposed to the investment required
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to create it) is costlier to measure.199 Therefore, a value-based patent regime for
tailoring patent protection will come at unnecessarily high administrative costs
and is inadvisable. Additionally, the incentive structure created under such a
regime is distorted in allowing the continued filing of low-investment patents.
As we explain above, there is no need to use the patent system to incentivize
inventions that required very low investment.
E.

Existing Patent Valuation Methods

This section discusses the valuation component of our proposal and
describes a list of methods currently used to quantify the worth of patents and
inventions in monetary terms.200 These methods, which adopt a positive
economic perspective,201 are primarily used for licensing purposes.202
Theoretically, any of the different economic measures listed below, which
determine the worth of specific inventions, can be used to tailor the duration of
patent protection. In this section, we review these possible economic measures,
including rules of thumb, the market method, competitive advantage valuation,
discounted cash flow method, option pricing, and investment in the invention.
We argue that, while these methods are all possible, the measure of investment
in developing the invention is the preferable route for keying patent duration.
The reason for this is that investment is relatively easy to measure, compared
to other financial metrics and is also the most important factor to consider in
light of the goals of the patent system.
1. Rules of Thumb
“Rules of thumb” are often used to price patents for purposes of licensing,
especially for royalty rate payments.203 In particular, when the parties are
uncertain about whether the invention can be profitably exploited, it makes
sense for them to “agree to enter into a profit-sharing license rather than fix a

199. See infra notes 241–48 and accompanying text.
200. Josh Lerner & Anne Layne-Farrar, Valuing Patents for Licensing: A Practical Survey of the
Literature 2–7 (Mar. 3, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(examining when industry assumptions drive firms to license and how patents are ultimately licensed
while noting myriad ways of payment for value of patents).
201. Richard S. Toikka, Patent Licensing Under Competitive and Non-Competitive Conditions, 82 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 279, 279–80 (2000) (describing the impact of competitive markets
on licensee’s profits and overall patent value).
202. See Anna Boman & Jonas Larsson, Patent Valuation in Theory and Practice, EKONOMISKA
INSTITUTIONEN 1, 42–45 (2003) (discussing crucial factors affecting current valuation methods and
noting various factors that affect licensing value).
203. See Lerner & Layne-Farrar, supra note 200, at 7 (describing industry practices for pricing
patents).
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price for the patent and engage in a sales transaction.”204 Generally, patent
holders receive 5% of sales revenues or 25% of operation profit margins.205
Another frequently used rule calls for a 25%/75% split of profits.206 These rules
of thumb provide a one-size-fits-all approach that is simple and easy to apply.207
On the other hand, they ignore the specific characteristics of the patent being
licensed.208 As such, this method of valuation applies a rule of profit sharing
irrespective of the underlying patent’s quality or potential to promote followon innovation.209 As a result, such an approach cannot be the default valuation
method for our tailored protection regime because it does not provide a specific
price tag and fails to offer a valuation of the specific patent.
2. The Market Method
The valuation of an asset is commonly established via an estimate of its
price or the amount paid for it in a market exchange.210 The market method is a
comparative pricing approach according to which “the best metric for
determining the worth of a patent is the range of prices garnered in the sale of
similar technologies.”211 Theoretically, this method may be more considerate of
the potential economic benefit of the specific patent.212 However, the market
method assumes a positive economic point of view213 and does not always
account for the patent’s quality compared to similar technologies.214
204. See F. Russel Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex
Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1191 (2003) (noting techniques parties can use
when there is uncertainty about an invention’s profitability).
205. Damien Geradin & Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value Apportionment Rules for Complex, MultiPatent Products, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 763, 778 (2011) (noting a common
rule used for valuing licensed patents).
206. See LAUREN JOHNSTON STIROH & RICHARD T. RAPP, M ODERN METHODS FOR THE
VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6–7 (1998), https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/
publications/archive1/3864.pdf [https://perma.cc/PMX7-U2CL] (describing general formulas for
profit splitting).
207. Lerner & Layne-Farrar, supra note 200, at 7 (describing a one-size-fits-all approach to patent
valuation).
208. Id. (noting the drawbacks of using the rule of thumb for patent valuation).
209. Denton & Heald, supra note 204, at 1190 (discussing the drawback of valuation based on profit
sharing regardless of patent quality).
210. Ted Hagelin, Competitive Advantage Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets: A New Tool for IP
Managers, 44 IDEA 79, 80 (2003) (“The valuation of an asset is an estimation of its price. The price of
an asset is the amount paid for an asset in a market exchange.”).
211. Lerner & Layne-Farrar, supra note 200, at 8.
212. Russell L. Parr & Gordon V. Smith, Quantitative Methods of Valuing Intellectual Property, in
THE NEW ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 39, 55–58
(Melvin Simensky & Lanning G. Bryer eds., 1994) (analyzing the benefits of the use of the market
method when valuing patents).
213. Id. at 58 (explaining the assumption that best efforts are used to expand application of
intellectual property).
214. Id. (showing how uniqueness of certain patents makes using the market approach more
difficult).
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3. Competitive Advantage Valuation (“CAV”)
A patent provides an exclusive right of limited duration over a new,
nonobvious invention, where the right to sue others for infringement is granted
in return for publication of the invention.215 Therefore, “the direct financial
value of a patent or patent application per se, must be the value of the potential
extra profits obtainable from fully exploiting the invention defined by the
patent’s claims in the patent’s presence compared with those obtainable without
patent protection.”216 Accordingly, the major premise of the CAV method is
that the value of an intellectual property asset should be derived entirely from
the value of the product, process, or service that utilizes it.217 The CAV method
assumes that the value of such an asset can be best measured by the competitive
advantage that it contributes to a product, process, or service.218 This
competitive advantage is defined as the advantages or disadvantages of an asset
in comparison to an average substitute intellectual property asset.219 While this
model is based on a logical association of variables and utilizes simple input
values,220 it necessarily requires a significant degree of speculation. The main
variables in the CAV method are the net present value of the product, process,
or service incorporating the intellectual property asset and the competitive
advantage contribution of the asset to the net present value.221
4. The Discounted Cash Flow Method
The discounted cash flow method relies on the same kinds of calculations
that financiers employ in ascribing value to other kinds of investment
opportunities.222 In particular, this method determines that the price of a patent
can be expressed as the present value of the future stream of economic benefits
derived from ownership.223 Regardless of this method’s accuracy, it is a purely
economic method of valuation that includes “projected sales of products based

215. Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents: A Review of Patent Valuation Methods with
Consideration of Option Based Methods and the Potential for Further Research 2 (Judge Inst., Working Paper
No. 21/97, 1997).
216. Id.
217. Hagelin, supra note 210, at 81 (describing the general principles of the competitive advantage
valuation method).
218. Id. at 81–82 (identifying competitive advantage as the main contributing factor to the value
of an intellectual property asset).
219. Id. at 82 (defining competitive advantage contribution as the difference between a given asset
and an average replacement).
220. See id. at 112–13 (concluding that CAV can be used in multiple valuation contexts).
221. Id. at 82 (describing the key variables in the CAV method).
222. Lerner & Layne-Farrar, supra note 200, at 10 (describing the discounted cash flow method).
223. Id. (describing how a patent price is expressed under the discount cash flow method).
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on the patent over its expected life or any increased share of sales as compared
to competitors, net of any capital requirements of production.”224
5. The Option Pricing Method
Another type of valuation method described in the literature is based on
option valuation formulas,225 which were primarily developed for use in pricing
financial options.226 These methods were found also applicable to patents due
to the many similarities between these two types of assets.227 Both patents and
financial options establish a future right to exploit an asset and exclude others
from it.228 The owner of a stock option has a right to obtain “an exclusive . . .
equity interest in the underlying firm.”229 Similarly, the owner of a patent has
“the right to exclude others from using the underlying invention, and further
investment is required to exploit its commercial potential.”230 Additionally,
financial options and patents are rights of limited duration: patents are limited
by their expiration dates, and options are limited by their exercise dates.231
Furthermore, both patents and financial options are directly linked to an
underlying asset—an innovation or a firm, respectively—and both can be used
to leverage or hedge against variance in prices.232 Lastly, similar valuation
challenges exist with regard to both assets in that both offer potential future
earnings that cannot be priced accurately without making a complex series of
economic predictions.233
In 1973, Myron Scholes and Fischer Black published their option valuation
formula, which offered for the first time exact and prompt option pricing
solutions.234 Options on an underlying asset can be valued, according to Scholes
and Black, if information exists regarding different items: the current price of
the asset, the exercise price of the option, the expiration date of the option, the
standard deviation of the underlying asset returns, and the risk-free interest rate
224. Id. (describing the challenge of separating purely economic value from other factors affecting
sales and profitability).
225. See generally Ariel Pakes, Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European
Patent Stocks, 54 ECONOMETRICA 755, 755 (1986) (developing a model that allows recovering the
distribution returns from holding patents at each age over the lifespan of patents from information on
patent renewals to enable value calculations).
226. See Pitkethly, supra note 215, at 10 (indicating the primary function of option pricing).
227. See Denton & Heald, supra note 204, at 1185 (referring to the usefulness of the market
valuation method for patent valuation).
228. Id. at 1194 (stating that stock options and patents represent future rights to exploit and
exclude).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. (comparing stock options to patents in relation to the underlying assets).
233. Id. (providing examples for valuation difficulty for patents and options).
234. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL.
ECON. 637, 640–53 (1973) (introducing a formula for pricing an option).
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and distribution function for the asset price.235 Option pricing methods “account
for total risk, including the impact of uncertainty on the value of the patent,”
while providing “managers with more flexibility in evaluating the strategic
possibilities entailed in licensing” a patent.236 Yet, scholars also highlight some
of this method’s shortcomings.237
6. Patent Investment
Patent investment is currently measured under the cost method for patent
valuation. The cost method approach for valuing patents simply calculates the
cost of developing and patenting the invention in question.238 Currently, this
method considers only historic costs of acquisition while ignoring future
benefits that may accrue from the patent and influence its value.239 While it
does consider one important indicator of patent quality—the cost of developing
the underlying invention—it does so from a positive economic perspective.240
We argue that the cost method is the preferable approach for the investmentbased route described in this Article. However, under our regime the patentee
should be able to recoup more than historic costs of acquisition, and the cost
method will be adjusted to include any expense incurred in creating the
invention.
Measuring patent investment using the cost method is preferable to other
methods described above that attempt to capture the benefit produced from the
invention, rather than its cost. In particular, while the cost method utilizes
information regarding out-of-pocket expenses (in all stages of the work on the
invention), the methods described above, focusing on the benefit of the patent
(rather than its cost), necessitate some speculation regarding future earnings or
comparative advantage of the invention resulting from its use. Thus, true
estimation of the value of any asset, as opposed to the investment required to
create it, is of necessity an uncertain prediction.241 This is especially true

235. See Pitkethly, supra note 215, at 12 (highlighting the advantages of the Black and Scholes
approach).
236. Lerner & Layne-Farrar, supra note 200, at 12.
237. Id. at 11–12 (suggesting that one of the shortcomings of the option-pricing method is lack of
appropriate inputs). For example, it can be argued that option-pricing methods do not account for the
normative question of how to valuate the patent based on its quality. See id.
238. Id. at 8 (discussing the method of valuing patents based on the cost method).
239. Pitkethly, supra note 215, at 6 (explaining the drawbacks of the cost method of patent
valuation).
240. It should be noted that patent valuation can be manipulated in different ways, affecting overall
patent quality. Denton & Heald, supra note 204, at 1183 (recognizing the cost method’s limitations
when valuing a patent).
241. Hagelin, supra note 210, at 80 (explaining the correlation between the estimated patent value
and actual prices).
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regarding the value of intellectual property assets.242 Indeed, predicting the
value of intellectual property assets is especially indeterminate for a few major
reasons.243 First, established markets for the exchange of intellectual property
assets do not yet exist.244 Second, intellectual property assets are rarely
comparable.245 Third, the terms and conditions of intellectual property
exchanges vary widely, and the details of such exchanges, especially prices, are
rarely available to the public.246 Fourth, there exists a “multiplicity of factors
that affect patents’ value over time.”247 Thus, establishing an accurate model of
patent valuation is rather elusive.248 Therefore, while possible to use, valuation
methods not based on investment are significantly costlier and introduce
additional uncertainty. While such methods can be used to assess the value of
the patent upon approval and issuance, we believe their use will overburden
applicants and officials alike. The cost method described here, or some variation
of it, is therefore the best approach for keying patent duration in terms of
administrative costs and realization of the goals of the patent system.
F.

Regulating the Process of Patent Valuation

Under our proposed model, when a patent is approved, it will undergo a
valuation process to determine its level of investment. Such determinations will
provide a tool to assess patent duration. Rather than fixing a one-size-fits-all
term of twenty years from filing, under this regime the duration of the patent
will be determined based on the period of time needed to recoup patentee
investment, plus a predetermined percentage of profit. The patentee and the
valuation agency will assess how much time is needed given the declared
investment. It is important to note that providing an estimate regarding the
duration of each patent upfront is needed so that the innovative community has
a clear sense regarding the expiration dates of such patents as well as when they
will enter the public domain, which is the engine for future innovation.249 Our
proposal suggests nominating a regulating body that would tag each issued
patent with an appropriate protection period according to the level of
investment. Appointing such a regulator would ensure objectivity,
242. Id. (discussing why intellectual property asset valuation is more uncertain than real or personal
property valuation).
243. Id.
244. Id. (acknowledging that intellectual property markets have not been established yet).
245. Id. at 80–81 (explaining why intellectual property assets are difficult to compare).
246. Id.
247. Denton & Heald, supra note 204, at 1175 (acknowledging the difficulty of establishing the
value of a patent).
248. Id.
249. See generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003) (discussing the centrality of the public domain for
the production of culture and knowledge and the effects of copyright and patent policy on the public
domain).
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predictability, stability, and proficiency in applying the proposed scheme.250 It
would also protect against price manipulations by those possessing strong
bargaining power because it provides full disclosure of information pertaining
to the cost of developing the underlying invention.
The most suitable body to implement the proposed model is the USPTO.
Under the proposed model, valuation is conducted upon approval and prior to
issuance. As the entire process of patent examination is performed at the
USPTO, it makes sense to nominate the USPTO as the body in charge of
performing the valuation.251 Additionally, because the USPTO is the
governmental body responsible for examining patent applications according to
the statutory requirements for patentability, it is optimally situated to execute
the task of investment assessment, using eligible valuation agencies. Such
assessment would be managed through a new special division of the USPTO.
Several existing valuation agencies can perform the process of patent
valuation required in the proposed model.252 The USPTO may elect a few
agencies that will conduct valuations under its auspices. Applicants will have to
elect a qualified agency working with the USPTO to conduct the valuation and
will bear the costs of valuation. The patentee will provide the agency with
information required for valuation, as well as providing her own valuation if
interested. The process of assessing the investment of the patent will essentially
resemble the process of determining patentability: the patent applicant will be
required to submit, in addition to her application and required fees, all relevant
evidence that may assist the agency in determining patent investment. After
the valuation is completed, the patent will be issued, and its duration will be
determined based on the estimated time needed for recouping the investment.
The patent owner will then have thirty days to contest this valuation and submit
her opposition, paying an additional fee processing this challenge. Within this
period of time, the patent will remain valid. A board of appeals that consists of
valuation agency members will review the opposition and issue a final patent
valuation. This board’s determination will be final. It should be noted that the
determination of investment is subject to updating, as detailed above, because
most patents are filed early in the life of an invention before significant
investment is incurred.253

250. See Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios Through
Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 469–70 (2007) (noting that a
consistent regulatory system will provide for stability).
251. See Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent
Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 134–35 (2006) (describing the resources available to the USPTO).
252. See, e.g., Forbes Top 25 Intellectual Property Valuation Firms, CONSOR.COM (Aug. 7, 2017),
http://consor.com/forbes-top-25-intellectual-property-valuation-service-firms/
[https://perma.cc/
R85P-YEN2].
253. Cotropia, Folly, supra note 140, at 68–70, 72–81.
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Establishing the recommended special division may impose additional
administrative costs on the patent system generally and on patent applicants
specifically.254 Indeed, pursuant to the above proposal, additional costs will be
introduced into the patent prosecution process. These additional administrative
costs would be financed either by patent applicants through elevated patent
application fees or by the general public through taxation.255 Note, however,
that in the long term these heightened administrative costs will ultimately be
mitigated due to the prospective decrease in low-quality patent applications. 256
Indeed, since the proposed model aims to create a direct linkage between patent
protection and patent investment, it would decrease the incentive to file lowinvestment patent applications, while increasing the incentive to file highinvestment ones.257 Assuming it is generally costlier and harder to develop highquality inventions than low-quality ones, the number of patent applications
should eventually decrease.258 Such a prospective decrease in the number of
overall patent applications should, in turn, reduce the volume of human capital
necessary to administer the examination process.259 Conceivably then, the initial
increase in administrative costs should only be temporary260 and tolerable,
especially if a substantial improvement in patent quality follows.261 In any event,
the fact that prosecution costs may increase should not deter the filings of
patents—not even filings by independent inventors and small businesses—as
payment could be postponed until the patentee begins to profit from her
invention.

254. U.S. PATENT & T RADEMARK OFFICE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PATENT PUBLIC
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 16 (Nov. 30, 2007), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/
offices/com/advisory/reports/ppac_2007annualrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6JS-EPH2].
255. It is important to note that since 1990 the USPTO has been fully fee-funded as a result of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat. 1388, 1389–91.
This means fees collected from patentees currently cover the full operational needs of the USPTO.
GLENN J. MCLOUGHLIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20906, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: A BRIEF EXPLANATION 1 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RS20906.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD65-5LB9].
256. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK O FFICE, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: SETTING
AND ADJUSTING PATENT FEES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 10 OF THE LEAHY-S MITH
AMERICA INVENTS ACT 95 (Jan. 18, 2013) (suggesting that an increase in patent application fees could
reduce the number of patent applications).
257. See id. (analyzing the benefits of increased patent application fees).
258. Id.
259. See id. at 15 (concluding that an increase in the number of patent applications that are filed
will necessarily bring about higher USPTO expenses on salaries and human capital).
260. See id. at 5 (suggesting a “three-month patent operating reserve” to support sustainable
funding).
261. See id. at 95 (acknowledging that potential costs to society will bring about reduced innovation
and inefficient research and development).

98 N.C. L. REV. 481 (2020)

2020]

RECOUPMENT PATENT

519

III. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF THE MODEL
This part discusses the benefits of the proposed model and offers responses
for some possible counterarguments. Overall, even though the proposed regime
introduces some costs, these costs are worthwhile considering the current crisis
in the patent system and the urgent need to improve its function.
A.

Benefits

Our proposed recoupment patent system promotes a few objectives:
improving patent quality, enhancing patent commercialization, preventing
abusive acts of price manipulation, mitigating the problem of deadweight loss,
attenuating the effects of anticommons and patent thickets phenomena,
reducing litigation costs, and bringing the system closer to a system of prizes
and rewards. These objectives are discussed in greater detail below. First, our
proposal will improve overall patent quality. Bolstering the correlation between
patent investment and patent protection through the proposed system would
incentivize high-quality innovation while suppressing exclusivity over lowquality innovation. Moreover, the proposed system introduces an additional
screening mechanism for inventions above and beyond their current
examination for patentability. Such a system may disincentivize or minimize
the effects of defensive and cross-licensing patenting, incentivizing in their
place the filing of patents that allow immediate recoupment, usually inventions
that are commercialized.
Second, the proposed system will enhance patent commercialization,
breaking the business model of NPEs and patent trolls. Specifically, under the
proposed model, holding noncommercialized patents for licensing and litigation
purposes will become unprofitable and actually impossible from the moment
the patentee recoups her investment. Recall that the level of investment is
adjustable during the lifetime of the patent, and this should encourage
investment in commercialization, which exceeds patent protection, over
licensing and litigation, which add nothing to the investment, and therefore
effectively shortens patent protection. Since the proposed system matches
patent holders’ ability to extract licensing fees and earn litigation fees with the
level of investment in the patent, keeping patents noncommercialized will keep
their overall investment level—and consequently the potential fees they could
generate—low.262
Third, a recoupment patent scheme will prevent abusive acts of price
manipulation. By creating limitations on the recoupment to which a patentee is
eligible, the proposed method can stop patent owners from obtaining more
licensing revenue than the investment in the process of invention justifies.

262. See supra Part I.
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Once information regarding patent investment is publicly disclosed, it will
affect licensors’ ability to extract excessive royalties.
Fourth, and closely related, the proposed regime will mitigate the problem
of deadweight loss associated with patent monopolies. Since low-investment
patents will only entitle patentees to short-duration protection, patentees will
only be able to sell such patents for a low price, thereby limiting the costs society
has to pay for these inventions.
Fifth, such a regime will attenuate the effects of both the anticommons
phenomenon and patent thickets. Unlike the one-size-fits-all regime, under a
recoupment patent regime, the ability of patentees to extract excessive royalties
and hold out will be significantly reduced, and, as a result, the effects of
anticommons tragedies or patent thickets will be very limited. To illustrate this,
consider again the situation in which several patentees hold patent rights on
different components that are necessary inputs for the production of a single
product. Under a recoupment regime, these patentees will have limited power
to hold out and extort rents from the producer, as they typically will not be
entitled to a twenty-year period of protection for a patent that only reflects a
small investment.
Sixth, this proposal will reduce litigation and related costs because it limits
patent damages, linking them to the investment in the development of the
invention. This in turn will bring about greater certainty and clarity regarding
patent validity and, as a result, will reduce both the rates and costs of litigation.
Finally, the proposed model brings the patent system closer to a system of
prizes and rewards. By tailoring protection according to the investment in the
development of the invention, we essentially assign greater value to highinvestment inventions and lesser value to low-investment inventions, thus
operating in a way that resembles the way prizes and rewards would operate.
While this does not provide the full advantages of prizes and rewards, such as
the lack of the invention’s exclusivity, our system nevertheless offers benefits
that do not exist under regimes of prizes and rewards, such as avoiding the
financial burden on the state that prizes and rewards would entail and affording
a more egalitarian system for rewarding innovation.
B.

Challenges

Many potential challenges to the proposed model must be addressed.
First, unlike the relatively low administrative costs of the one-size-fits-all
model,263 our tailored model may entail higher administrative costs of two
types: high costs for licensing negotiations and costs stemming from patentee

263. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 247.
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attempts to manipulate the system.264 As Louis Kaplow suggested, rewarding a
more valuable invention with stronger protection can entail high administrative
costs.265 Specifically, some scholars contend that the more uniform the scope of
the patent protection, the less costly the process of negotiating, drafting, and
policing licensing agreements.266 Conversely, when patent rights are specific to
the invention, the negotiating parties must be more precise in defining the
scope of the license. Additionally, a single standard of patent protection also
spares the litigation costs of third parties who seek to challenge the boundaries
of protection.267 As Bell and Parchomovsky put it, variations in patent
protection mean that “[c]ourts will have to expend efforts after the fact to
determine the boundaries of the different rights, and legislators will have to do
the same ex ante. Together, these efforts can impose substantial costs on
society.”268 Additionally, the investment recoupment regime may introduce
costs pertaining to manipulation of the system, such as attempts by patentees
to game the system with their investment, reporting higher investment costs
for their inventions. The problem can be even more significant in large and
global corporations, which can distribute costs between different jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, in the long term, any increase in the costs of administering
our proposed invention-tailored protection should be mitigated by an overall
decrease both in the filing of extremely low-value patents and in the assertion
of such patents against competitors.269 As we have shown above, the one-sizefits-all system entails many challenges and costs, and it is generally agreed that
the current system is inherently unfair. The current system is considered unfair
in that it distorts incentives for innovation and, in the end, does not
appropriately reward high-value and high-investment innovation. Many of the
problems created by the existing system cannot be priced economically, but
their negative impact on innovation is immense.270 Moreover, many of the
concerns raised may be addressed by the safeguards we have introduced, such
as filing and renewal fees, reporting duties, etc. Additionally, manipulation by
global corporations may be avoided by introducing uniform international
reporting standards and information sharing between national patent offices,
which have been effective in other contexts, such as international taxation of
global corporations. Accordingly, while a tailored system is arguably more time
264. See Duffy, supra note 49, at 507–09 (arguing against any arrangement that allows patentees to
renegotiate patent protection).
265. Kaplow, supra note 91, at 1828 (discussing the social costs of rewarding more valuable
inventions stronger protection).
266. Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property
Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1399 (2009).
267. Id. at 1425.
268. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 248.
269. Infra Part IV.
270. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 91–93.
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consuming and introduces higher costs of examination and evaluation, we
believe these costs are not excessive given the advantages and the cost-savings
the system introduces.
Second, and more specifically, our proposed system may introduce high
costs for inventors in documenting investments and valuation, as well as higher
filing and renewal fees. This new system may raise litigation and licensing costs
if inventors have to establish their investment as a precondition to licensing or
for establishing damages during litigation. An investment-based regime may
plausibly require separate documentation for each and every invention,
requiring the inventor to separate the costs introduced by each project and
attributing costs to each project when there are costs that pertain to multiple
projects. Inventors, however, especially corporate inventors, who file for and
are issued the majority of patents,271 usually document their activities anyway,
regardless of the patent regime in place. Such documentation is usually done to
establish priority and credit for the invention. Therefore, it seems unlikely that
the proposed regime will introduce prohibitively high costs.
Third, another popular argument in support of a one-size-fits-all approach
is that it reduces information costs.272 “The more variance there is, the greater
the informational burden with which the public must contend.”273 Since patent
rights apply against everyone, allowing private players to determine the scope
of their rights independently allegedly raises information costs for third parties.
Nonetheless, as we demonstrate, there are ways to overcome information
deficiencies in investment-tailored regimes of patent protection, especially by
subjecting patentees to transparent declaration requirements, under which they
must provide periodic statements of their earnings, and also by imposing on
patentees the burden of proving their statements of incurred costs during
licensing and litigation.274
Fourth, it may be argued that the USPTO is not the right agency to
administer and enforce the proposed patent system effectively. The USPTO is
arguably not equipped to estimate patent value; the examiners are overworked
and spend very little time evaluating applications.275 They also lack policy
experience and, as a result, would face the kind of public choice problems with
which Congress might be better positioned to grapple.276 Therefore, it might be
argued that it is unlikely that the USPTO can master such a recoupment regime.
271. Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent Citations Data
File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8498, 2001) (showing that corporate inventors file the majority of patents).
272. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Y ALE L.J. 1, 2 (2000).
273. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 249.
274. Infra Part IV.
275. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 23–24.
276. Id. at 24–25.
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While such arguments are convincing with regards to the system described by
scholars such as Lemley and Burk,277 they are less convincing regarding our
proposed model. Our model relies more on applicant filings and reporting as
well as external agencies’ objective valuations and less on the USPTO’s actual
involvement or public choice assessment.
IV. THE RECOUPMENT MODEL AND ALTERNATIVE REFORM PROPOSALS
Several scholars have recently highlighted the crisis in the patent system
and advanced their own proposals for reform.278 Such writers contend that
according all inventions the same monopolistic protection irrespective of their
inherent differences results in society paying too high a price for innovation
and more monopoly losses than are strictly necessary to incentivize
innovation.279 While we support this contention, we believe our proposal does
a better job at addressing the inefficient asymmetry between the nature of a
given invention and the type of protection it receives.
Bell and Parchomovsky introduced a prominent criticism of the efficacy
of the current, one-size-fits-all patent system. They proposed replacing the
current general regime of patent protection with one that allows patentees to
choose the level of protection from a menu of options, with varying degrees of
protection terms, scopes, and remedies.280 Accordingly, patentees whose
inventions portend a rather short commercial life would be able to purchase a
shorter term of protection and perhaps waive their right to injunctive relief,
while paying a relatively low price for their patents.281 Such a “[v]oluntary
relinquishment of protection, either in terms of time or scope, would result in
social net gain by reducing the deadweight loss associated with patent
protection.”282 Importantly, the scheme proposed by Bell and Parchomovsky
differentiates legal protection entirely based on the choice of the patentee.
Unlike our proposal, Bell and Parchomovsky’s offers no connection between the
duration of protection and the objective investment or value of the patent.
Unsurprisingly, it is this absolute freedom to choose the desired length
and scope of protection, which Bell and Parchomovsky afford patentees and
view as one of the major advantages of their proposal, that actually constitutes
the model’s main drawback. Without any objective guidelines or external
review, a nonregulated, self-tailored regime of patent protection can easily miss
its goals. First, patentees may choose to pay less for a shorter term of protection
and perhaps even give up their right to injunctive relief but demand royalties
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Infra Part IV.
See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 2–4; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 1, 4–6.
See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 234.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 235.
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far in excess of what they would have demanded were they automatically
granted the original patent duration of twenty years. This might be done in
order to maximize patentee profits during this shortened period of patent
protection. In such instances, Bell and Parchomovsky’s model would effectively
increase rather than reduce the deadweight loss that patent protection inflicts
on society.
Second, and much more important, for powerful patent holders and
especially patent trolls, the need to pay more for broader protection may not be
sufficiently threatening. With enormous potential gains from patent
monetization, patentees may uniformly find it worthwhile to elect the highest
rate possible in order to receive the maximum patent protection available.
Patent trolls will thereby purchase high patent protection and then use it to
litigate aggressively, as they do now. In fact, because Bell and Parchomovsky’s
model is expected to cost them more for the same scope and length of protection
that they would have received under today’s one-size-fits-all system, it is
reasonable to assume that strategic players will pass this increase in expenses on
to users by raising their rent-seeking monetary demands. To compensate for
the increased price of patent protection, patentees would increase their demands
for royalties during licensing negotiations and intensify their litigation threats.
In contrast to Bell and Parchomovsky’s objective, this sort of strategic behavior
would raise the price of patents and their respective litigation costs, while
diminishing instead of enhancing social welfare. This objection seems to us
sufficient to reject Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal.
Third, Bell and Parchomovsky’s self-tailored regime may favor
experienced, powerful patentees over small, independent inventors. The
relatively high price of broader patent protection may discourage small and
independent inventors from engaging in research and development in the first
place. For such inventors, agreeing to a reduced patent duration or a narrower
scope of protection could frustrate their ability to recoup their initial investment
costs. These inventors would be consequently discouraged from engaging in any
inventive activity in the first place. Hence, it may turn out that a self-tailored
regime, under which patentees are free to pay for extended patent protection
without any external oversight, would effectively impair the position of small
inventors without having any meaningful effect on big corporations, which have
the financial ability to pay whatever it takes to perfect their protection.
Our proposed model succeeds where Bell and Parchomovsky’s model
collapses. Specifically, our investment-tailored system not only differentiates
between different types of inventions, correlating between patent investment
and patent duration, but also promotes external screening. It introduces a
crucial component of objectivity that is currently missing from alternative
proposals for invention-tailored protection. This element of objectivity means
that patent trolls will not have the option, available to them under Bell and
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Parchomovsky’s regime, to pay high fees for strong patent protection over lowquality inventions. Under our model, patent investment will be determined
objectively, based on formal estimates of external professionals that are accepted
by the USPTO. Additionally, the model will apply several safeguards to ensure
patentees do not overstate their costs. First, the proposed model will make filing
and renewal fees dependent on declared patentee investment. The higher the
costs of investment associated with a specific invention, the higher the attached
filing and renewal fees. Second, during licensing and litigation, patentees will
bear the burden of proof that they actually accrued their declared costs. These
two mechanisms will discourage patentees from providing excessive
declarations of invention costs.
Our proposed combination of external patent valuations with internal
safeguards ensures that the investment model will not favor larger, more
experienced corporations over small, independent inventors. Even though the
latter might have limited resources for investment in innovation, they can
search for external investors who can support their project all the way through
the filing of a patent. Moreover, our model will be able to reduce deadweight
loss from patent protection effectively, as our model is anticipated to not only
shorten the duration of invaluable patents but, even more importantly, limit
their prospective profits. Patentees who file valueless inventions will not be able
to earn more than what external valuation models will allow them to earn. At
the same time, inventors who invested very little resources in developing their
claimed inventions will also be restricted from inflicting excessive monopoly
prices on users. Such meaningful limitations over the future financial gains of
worthless patents will result in a direct increase in social welfare: it will spare
the excessive costs of low-value patents that cannot be justified by the
underlying invention’s technological contribution.
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley present a different proposal for a technologyspecific system of patent protection,283 as part of the growing literature
advocating technology-specific patent law to generate patent reforms.284 Burk
283. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) (describing recent trends of increasing divergence between the ways patent law
rules are applied in different industries).
284. E.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 97; Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models:
Toward a New Form of Intellectual Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1406–07 (2011); Michael J.
Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 W M. & M ARY L. REV. 1747, 1761–62 (2011); Daniel R. Cahoy, An
Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 587, 635–36 (2006);
Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U.
L. REV. 845, 847–49 (2006); Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & H IGH TECH. L.J. 269, 290–93, 297–300 (2006); Amir H. Khoury, Differential Patent
Terms and the Commercial Capacity of Innovation, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 373, 407 (2010); Jonathan
S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 321–26; Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming
the Patent System, 13 MICH . TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 495, 508 (2007); Peter S. Menell &
Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 50 (2013); Joshua D.
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and Lemley suggest that courts subject different technological fields of
invention and industries to different patent doctrines.285 Using the software and
biotechnology industries to demonstrate this concept, Burk and Lemley argue
that the application of the legal standard of the “person having ordinary skill in
the art” can lead to totally different results regarding validity and scope in
diverse industries.286 Therefore, they claim that it is important to ensure that
the wide variety of different legal rules is exploited optimally in different
technological contexts.287
While we agree with Burk and Lemley’s observations regarding the way
courts handle patent cases in different technological fields and agree that
different technological fields of invention share many common characteristics,
we do not believe that inventions within a specific industry are necessarily
similarly valuable. We take a more fine-grained approach that distinguishes
between patents within industries. For example, a specific invention within the
computer science industry can be a pioneering one, having an extremely high
anticipated value, while a different computer science invention may be close to
worthless. Granting both inventions equal protection imposes an excessive
burden on society: the social benefit of the later invention is outweighed by the
costs it imposes on competitors and the general public. As a result, society
overpays for the provision of a low-value patent. Additionally, because both
inventions are expected to confer similar benefits on their owners, future
inventors would be encouraged to invest their talent and resources in the least
expensive and complicated projects, further diminishing social welfare. On the
other hand, inventions in totally different industries may have similar economic
value or may otherwise inflict similar costs of invention on inventors. Such
inventions should merit similar patent protection, even though they pertain to
different technological fields.
Furthermore, under Burk and Lemley’s model, patentees will likely try to
game the system and draft their purported invention to appear pertinent to a
technological field that affords better patent protection.288 This is precisely what

Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 301, 307–09 (2011); F.M. Scherer,
Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 427
(1972); William Fisher III, The Disaggregation of Intellectual Property: How the Laws of Intellectual Property
Have Grown—and Grown Apart, HARV. L. BULL., Summer 2004, at 24, 29–31; Frank Partnoy, Finance
and Patent Length 12–17, 29 (U. San Diego Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 19, 2001),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=285144 [https://perma.cc/2T8J-N4NG]; Richard A. Posner, Why
There Are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012, 10:20 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/print/2012/07/why-there-are-too-manypatents-inamerica/259725/ [https://perma.cc/7SKG-AFBS].
285. Burk & Lemley, supra note 283, at 1158–85.
286. See id. at 1156, 1185, 1189–91.
287. Id. at 1194–96.
288. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 65, at 275.
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happened in the fields of software and business method patents.289 Because
technology-specific regimes entail no means to guarantee the cooperation of
patentees, they are very likely to become extremely burdensome on judges, who
would struggle to classify the industry to which a given invention belongs.
Sophisticated and experienced patentees are expected to use confusing claim
drafting to receive favorable treatment, making the process of claim
construction even more encumbered and time consuming than it already is.290
A technology-tailored system of patent protection also suffers from several
practical implementation barriers. First, the boundaries between technologies
are highly ambiguous and mutable.291 In fact, many inventions simultaneously
fall within multiple distinct technological categories.292 Second, technological
and market conditions evolve rapidly, further complicating the task of designing
and implementing technology-specific patent laws that keep pace with these
changes.293 Additionally, and no less importantly, we still lack a clear and
coherent analysis of how patent protection affects progress and innovation in
different industries. Therefore, it appears that the time is not ripe for tailoring
patent awards according to technological characteristics.294 Indeed,
technological differentiation is significantly more involved than merely
dividing between pharmaceutical and software patents. There are over 260,000
distinct categories of technology recognized by the USPTO.295 It is highly
doubtful that these could ever be ranked properly according to their need for
protection based solely on their technological characteristics.296 Note, however,

289. See Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on the Time to Market of
Inventions, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 710–12 (2014). Roin demonstrates that when courts initially
prohibited pure software patents, patentees responded by drafting software claims as “computer
systems” that implemented software to get around the restriction. Id. Likewise, when the PTO created
a “second look” program for business method patents to provide for a more rigorous examination
process, patent applicants simply reframed their business method claims so they could file their
application in a different PTO division. Id.
290. Wagner, supra note 16, at 2146 (suggesting that under the current patent regime, patentees
have an incentive to “draft patent applications that effectively obscure the true scope of the invention
and its relationship to the prior art”).
291. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 97–99; Roin, supra note 289, at 710.
292. JAE HUN PARK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRY STANDARDS 162–63 (2010); Raj Bawa,
Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation and the Crisis at the U.S. Patent Office, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 699,
707 (2007) (discussing the multiple technological categories of nanotechnology inventions); Mark A.
Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 614–15 (2005).
293. PARK, supra note 292, at 162–63.
294. See Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 43, 45 (2012).
295. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK O FFICE, COOPERATIVE PATENT CLASSIFICATION 14
(2012), http://www.cooperativepatentclassification.org/publications/UsptoUserDayGeneralIntro.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MN7-7K9Q].
296. See Roin, supra note 289, at 709.
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that we do not challenge the practice common in courts to take into account the
technological field of the invention while applying different patent doctrines.297
Our patent model clearly correlates investment and patent protection on
a case-by-case basis. Hence, it is much less likely to err in determining the
appropriate scope of patent protection. Every invention will be examined and
evaluated independently, regardless of the industry to which it supposedly
belongs. Such a high degree of individualization in defining the duration of
patent protection will ensure patentees do not receive more than they deserve
for their specific contributions. This will subsequently guarantee that society
does not overpay for worthless inventions. In addition, our model encourages
the cooperation of patentees with the USPTO in three important ways. First,
it requires all patentees to submit a periodic statement of earnings to allow both
the USPTO and third parties to estimate the remaining patent duration.298
Second, under our proposed model, filing and maintenance fees are derived
from the patentee’s declared investment costs; therefore, any exaggeration from
the side of the patentee will be reflected in the fees she will subsequently owe
the USPTO. Third, in our model, patentees bear the burden of proving the
declared costs of their invention during licensing and litigation. As such, any
misstatement from the patentee will increase her litigation costs and possible
responsibilities for damages.
A related, but more advanced, proposal for a tailored system of patent
awards has been advanced by Benjamin Roin.299 Noting that “[c]ertain types of
inventions take much longer to develop than others, and a lengthier time-tomarket strongly correlates with an increased need for patent protection and a
lower risk that patents will stifle subsequent innovation,”300 Roin suggests
differentiating between protections granted to patents in accordance with the
inventions’ time-to-market. This factor is arguably capable of matching the
need for protection with the risk of patents stifling subsequent innovation.301
Roin defines inventions’ “time-to-market” as the “time it takes to move from
the initial idea to its first sale as a commercialized product,”302 suggesting that
this factor is an observable proxy for optimal, technology-based patent strength.
At the crux of Roin’s proposal stands the proposition that “inventions’ time-tomarket strongly correlates with optimal patent strength.”303 Yet, it is possible to

297.
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Infra Section II.E.
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think of instances where worthless inventions take longer to mature into
marketable goods.304
According to Roin, the optimal patent award for inventions is primarily a
function of their R&D costs, the risk of failure in R&D, the anticipated future
revenue streams from the projects if they succeed, and the potential for
imitation by rivals.305 Roin further argues that an invention’s time-to-market is
a reliable indicator for all these factors.306 Yet, while longer time-to-market is
probably a reliable indicator of higher commercialization costs, we are not sure
to what extent it adequately reflects the inventor’s incurred costs of invention.
An inventor does not need to provide proof of actual sales in order to secure a
patent.307 This means that her initial costs of invention may reflect only a small
portion of her ultimate commercialization costs, which Roin generally, but with
slight imprecision, describes as R&D costs.308 Moreover, according to Roin,
“Inventions that generate lower annual sales revenues likely need stronger
protection to be profitable, since it takes more time for the invention to produce
enough revenue for the firm to recover its R&D costs.”309 However, extended
time-to-market is obviously not the sole reason for low sales revenue. The
economic value of the invention, its prospective market, the invention’s
technological contribution, and effective consumer demand are no less, if not
more, important in determining the prospective annual earnings of a given
patent.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded that affording stronger patent
protection to inventions that take longer to reach the market is a socially
desirable policy lever. Strengthening patent protection inevitably results in
enhanced access barriers, which subsequently stifle innovation.310 Consumers
bear the increased deadweight loss of stronger patents, and subsequent
inventors are impeded from improving and advancing the strongly protected
invention.311 Arguably, providing stronger protection to patents having longer
time-to-market is not the optimal way of incentivizing their provisions.
304. See, e.g., Daniel C. Rislove, Comment, A Case Study of Inoperable Inventions: Why Is the USPTO
Patenting Pseudoscience?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1302–04 (discussing the development of the
inoperable cold fusion invention).
305. Roin, supra note 289, at 684.
306. Id.
307. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 11 (“But an inventor need not have actually ‘reduced to
practice’ the invention—that is, need not have built or physically tested the claimed invention in order
to file a patent application.”).
308. See Roin, supra note 289, at 728–29.
309. Id. at 699.
310. Arrow, supra note 125, at 616–17.
311. See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 1–28 (arguing empirically that the patent
system provides poor notice, which causes harm because it subjects technology investors to unavoidable
risk of disputes and litigation, thus resulting in a patent system which provides negative incentives to
invest in innovation); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 700–01 (applying the “tragedy of
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An additional reform proposal suggests instituting prizes and rewards in
lieu of patent protection. The rich literature concerning patent prizes includes
various suggestions on how an agency should determine, ex ante, the value of
the prize to be awarded to the inventor for the development of her invention as
an alternative mechanism to the exclusive rights granted by patents.312 These
valuation methods are ex ante in the sense that they are applied before the
invention turns into a desired commercial product, which is also the case for
many patents that are filed very early in the life of inventions. For example,
Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele described a prize system that
inventors could opt into instead of the patent system.313 Similarly, Michael
Kremer has described a system in which patent recipients would agree to give
up their patents in exchange for compensation that would be determined
through a unique auction process.314 Doug Lichtman has suggested that the
government could achieve the benefits of a prize system with much lower costs
by keeping the patent system and subsidizing consumers who would value
patented products above marginal cost but could not afford them at the
monopoly price.315 Michael Abramowicz’s proposal goes in a different direction
and suggests that a claimant will receive her prize at a later point in time when
the true commercial potential of her invention is known.316
These different ex ante reward systems provide inventors with prizes
instead of exclusive rights, and as such, they are outside the realm of patent
licensing. This ex ante valuation approach fits with our model, which also seeks
to reward inventors for their efforts but keeps a patent-based scheme. Prizes are
desirable for many reasons; however, our regime is superior to prizes in that it
awards tailored patent protection, which is sponsored by the market rather than
the state.
Lastly, Maayan Perel has also proposed a novel, ex ante method of patent
valuation for licensing purposes.317 Very much like the proposal in this Article,
she suggests that the value of patents should correlate with their technological
commons” concept to biomedical research patents); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 990 (1997) (discussing the difference between
improvement and imitation).
312. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 44–45; Abramowicz, Patent Prizes, supra note 45, at 119–20
(reviewing the literature suggesting prizes as an alternative to the current patent system); Janis, supra
note 45, at 939–41.
313. Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. &
ECON. 525, 525–27 (2001).
314. Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137,
1146 (1998).
315. Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of
Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 123–24 (1997).
316. Abramowicz, supra note 45, at 172–77.
317. Maayan Perel, An Ex Ante Theory of Patent Valuation: Transforming Patent Quality into Patent
Value, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 148, 196–222 (2014).
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contribution to adequately reward innovation. Her proposed method deviates
from existing methods in at least four aspects.318 First, it adopts a socialnormative perspective instead of a positive economic one. It essentially asks
what should be the license value, from the standpoint of the patent system and
not what that value would be in a world with no regulatory intervention.
Second, it is performed ex ante, upon the grant of patent protection, long before
any licensing negotiations are initiated. Third, it recommends flexible
limitations on the ultimate license value rather than setting a single, fixed price.
Fourth, it suggests subjecting the process of patent valuation to external
regulation instead of leaving it to the exclusive control of free market powers.
Perel advances a two-step, novel method of patent valuation, determining the
quality of a given patent according to proposed quality indicators and then
assigning flexible price limitations that correlate with such quality. Such a
method would promote four objectives.319 First, translating patent quality into
a numerical patent value would encourage high-quality innovation and improve
patent quality. Second, setting ex ante limitations on the licensing price the
patentee may ultimately demand would downgrade patent trolling. Third,
determining the price of a patent upon issuance would neutralize the
manipulative effect of external factors, such as the identity of negotiating
parties and their respective bargaining powers, as well as the circumstances
surrounding licensing negotiations. As a result, such a model could hamper
patentees’ ability to hold up subsequent innovation and impede future research.
Fourth, in the long term, this method would also reduce litigation costs and
litigation rates for the benefit of the public as a whole. We share many of the
underlying assumptions of Perel’s article regarding the desirability of an ex ante
approach to patent valuation. However, her article is limited to licensing. Here,
we present comprehensive proposals pertaining to the patent system as a whole.
As such, Perel’s proposal is of limited value for our purposes.
Our proposed system is the only proposal to tie patent protection directly
to patent investment, recognizing the crucial role of investment for the aims of
patent law and policy. Other reform proposals either ignore investment or are
based on proxies for investment and therefore offer less accurate results.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a novel model for patent protection designed to
overcome the epidemic of low-quality patents and the crisis it is currently
creating. It introduces the recoupment patent system, with its significant
safeguards, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages, and suggests that, if
we want to follow the wording and spirit of the constitutional mandate to
318. Id. at 196–235
319. Id. at 181–96.
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incentivize innovation, we should aspire to have higher patent quality. This
differentiated, invention-specific regime should be carefully designed in order
to achieve its ambitious goals. The proposed scheme is the right step in this
direction. The Article also explores alternative schemes that have been proposed
over the years as a way to either improve or replace the system, pointing to their
strengths and weaknesses. Our proposed framework offers differentiated length
of patent protection, tailored according to patent investment. We demonstrate
that this mechanism fits well with the dictates of patent theory and with the
goals of the patent system, and adequately addresses the current patent crisis.
This promising system can also be applied in other fields of intellectual
property law: mainly copyright law, trade secrecy, database law, and design law.
It offers a thoughtful way to afford incentives while not compromising
downstream innovation. However, the extension of our proposed model to
other fields of intellectual property should be the subject of other research
projects.

